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ABSTRACT 
  
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each corresponding to an essay on one topic in asset 
pricing. 
Chapter 1 is titled “How Do Oil Shocks Affect Stock Market Risk” and aims to explain some 
documented comovements between crude oil market and stock market and the predictability of 
oil prices on stock returns. Firstly, I illustrate a mechanism for oil shocks to translate into stock 
market risk under a 2-consumption good CCAPM model framework. Then I use U.S. data and a 
bivariate EGARCH-DCC model to estimate the dynamic second moments of crude oil price 
changes and stock returns. I find that oil price changes have significant effects on the second 
moments of the stock market returns but not the other way around. Furthermore, I find 
remarkable time-variation in both the empirical conditional volatilities and correlations. Based 
on these estimations, I construct the time-varying empirical risk premia. A preliminary test is 
done at the end of this paper to see if the empirical risk premia are able to explain the observed 
predictability of oil price changes on stock returns. The results point to the need for more 
sophisticated modeling of the interactions between oil and stock market risk. 
In Chapter 2 “Income Inequality and Asset Prices: A Cross-country Study”, I study the asset 
pricing implication of cross-country differences in income inequality. Using panel regression 
with year fixed effects, I document a strong negative relationship between cross-country stock 
market levels (as measured by each market’s P/D ratio) and cross-country income inequality 
levels after controlling for an extensive set of variables including conventional risk factors, 
country characteristics and degree of global market segmentation. I argue that this relationship 
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should be interpreted as the negative impact of income inequality on market price. This effect is 
both statistically and economically significant: On average, one unit increment in inequality (a 
0.01increament in income Gini, which ranges between 0 and 1) is shown to decrease the market 
P/D ratio by up to 2%. The inverse relationship between income inequality and price is stronger 
in developed countries than in developing countries. It is robust to alternative measures of stock 
market levels and income inequality. By decomposing price into expected excess returns and 
risk-free rates, I empirically identify the main channel through which inequality influences price: 
The inverse relationship observed between inequality and P/D ratio can almost be completely 
attributed to strong positive link between income inequality and interest rates; while I find no 
supporting evidence that cross-country excess returns are correlated with income disparities. 
These findings have important implications both for asset pricing modeling and for policy 
making. 
Chapter 3, titled “Income Heterogeneity, Inequality and Interest Rates” is an extended work of 
Chapter 2. It aims to explain the significant positive correlation between the cross-country 
differences in inequality and the cross-country differences in real interest rates documented in 
Chapter 2. In a discrete-time asset pricing model with heterogeneity, untradable income risks and 
CARA utility function, equilibrium interest rate, gross saving rate and consumption inequality 
are derived in closed-form solutions. It is shown analytically that both consumption inequality 
and the real interest rate are positively related to income heterogeneity (defined as the dispersion 
in idiosyncratic income risks in terms of their correlations to the aggregate risk). It is also shown 
that gross saving rate and the ratio of average consumption risk to average income risk can be 
used to proxy for income heterogeneity. Empirical tests confirm that saving rate helps reducing 
the positive role of income inequality in explaining cross-country variations in interest rates. 
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CHAPTER 1: HOW DO OIL SHOCKS AFFECT STOCK MARKET 
RISK 
1.1 Introduction 
In his 1983 paper, Hamilton points out that fluctuations in crude oil prices are a great contributor 
to many of the U.S recessions after World War II. Since then numerous efforts have been devoted 
to the study of impacts of oil shocks on U.S. economy. The conventional wisdom holds that oil 
price is an important driving force of the stock market. And some recent works find that positive 
crude oil price changes predict lower aggregate stock market returns. In order to explain the 
comovements between the two markets and to explain the observed predictability, it is important 
to understand how oil price changes affect stock returns. It is therefore necessary to take a closer 
look at the dynamic volatilities of the two series as well as the correlation between them in 
empirical study. It is also essential incorporate the oil-induced returns volatility as part of the 
market risk in theoretical modeling. 
In this paper, I examine how oil price shocks affect stock market risk. Firstly, I use a two-
consumption good CCAPM model to illustrate a mechanism through which oil shocks are 
transmitted to stock market risk. Traditionally, fluctuations in oil prices are considered to affect 
the economy mainly through their impact on costs of production. However, Kilian(2008) show 
that the transmission of oil shocks to the U.S. stock market “is driven not by domestic cost or 
productivity shocks, but by shifts in the final demand for goods and services.” In my model, a 
representative agent consumes two goods: oil and non-oil “numeraire” good. In such an 
economy, the representative agent not only cares about the aggregate consumption bundle, but 
also the relative consumption/ expenditure of oil to the other good. Therefore, in addition to the 
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“consumption risk” factor as in the single CCAPM model, an extra “composite risk” factor 
emerges in this two-consumption good setup. For example, if oil and the non-oil (numeraire) 
good are complements (which is the more realistic case than where they are substitutes), higher 
consumption of oil (when oil price is low) means the agent needs more of the numeraire 
consumption good. Thus the marginal utility of numeraire consumption goes up with oil 
consumption. In other words, the “composite risk” indicated by marginal utility of numeraire 
consumption increases when oil price declines. Thus if returns of an asset covary negatively 
(positively) with oil price when the price is high, the asset is a good (bad) hedge against the 
composite risk and investors request low (high) risk premium. In reality, the contemporaneous 
correlation between stock market returns and the oil price is usually negative following a large 
increase in crude oil price. So by linking the oil risk to the stock market risk, the mechanism 
described in the two-consumption good model sheds light on a risk-based explanation for the 
observation that positive oil price shocks drive lower stock market returns.  
In the paper, a maintained assumption is that only oil price changes caused by exogenous supply 
shocks have substantial impacts on the economy and the stock market. This is verified by my 
empirical evidence: Following Sørensen(2009), exogenous supply shocks are identified by 
important oil events such as turmoil in the Middle East or large OPEC quota changes. I show that 
almost all of the pronounced variations in the empirical risk premia coincide with these events. 
To do so, I first use a bivariate EGARCH-dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model to 
estimate the conditional volatility of stock returns and oil price changes, and the covariances 
between them. I find that oil shocks do have significant effects on the second moments of stock 
market returns, which corroborates the model. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the 
empirical second moments of stock returns and the empirical risk premia are time-varying. I then 
3 
 
isolate the exogenous supply shocks by above mentioned method. It can be seen that most of the 
biggest troughs and spikes in fitted empirical risk premia indeed occur on those oil event dates.  
My paper contributes to the literature by firstly proposing a simple mechanism that links crude 
oil market shocks to stock market risks. It also establishes such cross-market linkage empirically, 
thus providing propelling evidence supporting a risk-based explanation for the comovements and 
correlations between markets. This theory has the potential to explain some documented returns 
predictability of oil shocks on stocks and can be easily extended to study other cross-market 
linkages (e.g. between other commodities and stock market).  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related literature. Section 
1.3 presents the model and derives the pricing kernel as well as an explicit formula for the risk 
premia. Section 1.4 describes my empirical method, the data and fitted empirical risk premia. It 
also performs robustness checks and the preliminary predictive regression. Finally, Section 1.5 
concludes. 
1.2 Related Literature 
My paper is motivated by recent studies on relationship between oil price and stock market. For 
example, Jones and Kaul(1996) report negative relationship between oil price changes and 
aggregate stock returns. Pollet(2005) finds the predictable components of oil price changes are 
able to predict stock returns. Kilian and Park(2009) show that oil shocks account for 22% of the 
long-run variation in US real stock returns. They decompose oil price changes into three 
categories: oil price changes caused by shocks to oil production, by shocks to the aggregate 
global demand for commodity, and oil-specific demand shocks like precautionary demand 
shocks. They conclude that the conventionally documented negative (contemporaneous) relation 
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between oil price changes & stock returns are mainly due to oil-specific demand shocks. 
Driesprong et al.(2008) and Sørensen(2009) document changes in oil prices predict stock market 
returns. Although most of these papers find empirical evidence of the correlation between crude 
oil price and stock market, little has been done to further analyze the causes of their 
comovements. To my knowledge, my paper is one of the first to study the mechanism behind. I 
contribute to the literature by theoretically linking oil shocks to stock market risk as well as 
presenting empirical evidence of time-varying risk premia that are related to oil shocks.  
My work is also related to the studies on stock returns predictability. Among them, Fama and 
French(1989) argue that default spread and term spread can predict aggregate market returns 
since they contain information about future business conditions. Campbell and Shiller(1988) and 
Fama and French(1988) show price-dividend ratio can predict returns. Financial ratios like 
earnings ratio (Lamont(1998)) are also shown to predict stock returns. Ang and Bekaert(2007) 
find that real interest rates predict returns to some extent. These predictive factors are not in 
conflict with EMH since they can be considered to capture time-varying risk. However some 
researchers argue that certain returns predictors can only be attributed to underreaction or 
overreaction to information. For example, Hong et al.(2007) find that returns of some industries, 
including petroleum industry, forecast stock market returns by up to two months. They interpret 
the finding as evidence of “gradual diffusion” of information among investors. In contrast to 
Hong et al.(2007)’s interpretation, my work is more in line with the literature that build on time-
varying risk and rational stories. 
Finally, my paper is closely related to a line of papers on consumption-based CAPM models. 
Traditional CCAPM literatures assume a single consumption good (single Lucas tree). The 
representative agent is only concerned about the “consumption risk”, measured by the 
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conditional covariance of consumption growth with stock market returns. When a second 
consumption good (second Lucas tree) is considered, an extra risk factor is introduced: 
representative agent is not only concerned about the “consumption risk”, but also the “composite 
risk” as measured by the conditional covariance of relative consumption or expenditure of two 
goods with the stock market returns. The introduction of “composite risk” makes the pricing 
kernel and risk premium more volatile. Thus it helps provide possible solutions to some asset 
pricing puzzles. One case in point is Yogo(2006). Assuming a high risk aversion coefficient, 
Yogo uses a durable/ non-durable two-good model to explain the value premium and size 
premium as well as counter-cyclicality of risk premia. Another example is Piazzesi et al.(2007). 
The authors show that a housing/ non-housing model can partly solve the equity premium 
puzzle. In addition, they find that the share of housing expenditure in all consumptions can be 
used to forecast excess returns. In both Yogo and Piazzesi et al’s papers, they need the two good 
to be substitutes to produce desired results. My paper is similar to theirs in set-up of the model. 
But in my model, oil and non-oil consumptions are found to be complements rather than 
substitutes. Thus the mechanism of how the “composite risk” works is different from theirs. 
1.3 Model 
1.3.1 Setup 
Consider an economy with large numbers of identical agents who have preference over two 
consumption goods: Oil ( to ) and Non-oil consumption ( tc ). While it may be more realistic to 
think of oil as an intermediate good that can be both used for consumption and production, I 
leave it for future study. Here I only view oil as a final good for consumption. This abstraction 
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from more complicated structure helps us easily isolates the effects of oil price change on the 
consumption of the other goods. It also helps to solve some measurement issues in my empirical 
work.   
A representative agent maximizes her lifetime utility: 
0
[ ( , )]t t t
t
E u c ob
¥
=
å      (1) 
Where the per-period utility function is: 
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     (2) 
Parametere  is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil consumption. 
The larger the e , the more substitutable are the two goods and the smaller the e , the more 
complemental are the two goods. Ife =1, then the utility function collapses to the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function. Parameter s  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that dictates the 
substitutability between aggregate consumption bundles of different periods.  
As long as e  is not equal tos , the utility is inseparable. Mechanically, this implies an extra term 
in the pricing kernel that possibly makes it more volatile and helps raising risk premium. 
Intuitively, if e  is equal tos , then people are equally willing to substitute across goods and 
across time. There is then no essential difference between this two-good model and the standard 
model where people only care about cross-time tradeoffs. Only if e  is not equal to s , the 
“composite risk” is isolated from usual “consumption risk” and is priced additionally. 
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1.3.2 Pricing Kernel and Risk Premia 
In the multi-good case, the pricing kernel can be derived in terms of marginal utility of either 
good. Here I choose non-oil consumption good as the numeraire. This way I can easily compare 
the result to that of a standard model and identify the unique composite risk term.  
The pricing kernel is the present value of an extra unit of future numeraire (non-oil) 
consumption: 
( )/ ( ( 1))
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And the Euler equation is: 
 1 1[ ] 1t t tE M R+ + =                            (4)  
The first part of the pricing kernel in equation (3) is what we see in standard single-good 
CCAPM. It reflects the agent’s concern about the “(numeraire) consumption risk”: If returns of 
an asset covary positively with the numeraire consumption, then it is not an effective hedge and 
investors need to be rewarded with higher expected returns for bearing the risk. If e ¹ s , then 
the utility is inseparable and “composite risk” enters the pricing kernel as the second term. 
Consider the case of e < s  and e <1, i.e. oil and the non-oil consumption are complements. 
Higher consumption of oil (when oil price is low) means the non-oil consumption good is more 
desirable. Thus the marginal utility goes up. This means when oil price declines the “composite 
risk” is higher. When price is high, if returns of an asset covary negatively with oil price, the 
asset is then an effective hedge against the composite risk and the risk premium has negative or 
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smaller positive value. This mechanism links the oil price shocks to stock market risk and paves 
the way for a possible risk-based explanation for the predictability of oil shocks. 
The pricing kernel in equation (3) is expressed in relative quantity of the two goods. It is difficult 
to measure the actual quantity of consumption in oil and non-oil goods. On the other hand, the 
expenditure data of oil and non-oil consumption are more easily available and more reliable. 
Therefore, I define a new variable, oil/non-oil expenditure ratio, and write the pricing kernel in 
terms of this new variable. In the following part of this paper, the expenditure ratio will be used 
as the key state variable. 
The expenditure ratio of oil to non-oil consumption z  is defined as: 
o
t t
t c
t t
p oz
p c
=       (5) 
From the static FOC, I have: 
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Substituting into the expenditure ratio: 
1 1 (1/ )( ) ( )
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t t t t
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From (7) we can see that if e  is smaller than 1, the relative expenditure of oil goes up with oil 
price. Intuitively, it is natural to view oil and non-oil consumptions as complements more than 
substitutes – “You can’t drink gasoline” after all. So people cannot substitute out of the oil 
consumption too much when oil price rises. Therefore, the drop in oil consumption is not enough 
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to offset the increase in oil price and expenditure of oil goes in the same direction as price. 
The pricing kernel can now be written as: 
( )/( ( 1))
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Equation (8) is a more concise expression of the pricing kernel. The familiar CCAPM 
“consumption risk” factor is the first term, (numeraire) consumption growth. The second term is 
the “composite risk” factor, changes in expenditure ratio. It implies when oil and non-oil are 
complements (e <s  and e <1), assets that covary negatively with z (when oil price is high) have 
negative (or smaller positive) risk premium.  
To see this more clearly, I derive the explicit form of the empirical risk premium: 
1 1 1 1
1 cov ( ln , ) cov ( ln(1 ), )
( 1)t t t t t t
RP c r z rs e
s s e+ + + +
-
= D - D +
-
                    (9) 
Where c  is the non-oil (numeraire) consumption; z  is the expenditure ratio of oil consumption 
on non-oil consumption; r is stock market returns. 
Following Piazzesi(2007), I use a linearization approximation and write risk premium as: 
1 1 1 1
1 cov ( ln , ) cov ( ln , )
( 1) (1 )
t
t t t t t t
t
zRP c r z r
z
s e
s s e+ + + +
-
= D - D
- +
   (10) 
From (9) and (10), the risk premium consists of two terms: The first is conditional covariance 
between numeraire consumption growth and stock market returns. In my model, the numeraire 
consumption is non-oil consumption, different from (aggregate) consumption of the standard 
single-good CCAPM. There is no reason to expect that it behaves much different from the NIPA 
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aggregate consumption. On the other hand, oil prices experience sharp and sustained increase 
from time to time, resulting in big shifts in expenditure ratio change. Thus I expect the second 
term of the risk premium to be much more volatile than the first term. To see this, I plot the 
realized covariance of non-oil consumption with CRSP value-weighted market returns against 
the covariance of real WTI crude oil price with CRSP returns. Figure 1.1 shows that the former is 
much smoother than the latter.  
So the conditional covariance of expenditure ratio with stock market returns is the key to time-
varying risk premium and the key to understanding of the predictability of oil. In what follows, I 
model the conditional covariance and risk premium empirically and examine the properties of 
the estimated results. 
1.4 Empirical Risk Premium 
In this section, a first step is to empirically model the dynamics of covariance between stock 
market returns & oil/non-oil expenditure ratio. Then I construct empirical risk premia to see if it 
helps account for the predictability reported in previous literature. Since I expect the second 
moments to be time-varying, OLS is not appropriate for my estimation. Instead, I use a bivariate 
EGARCH-DCC type of model to fit the conditional volatility and conditional correlations. 
1.4.1 Data 
My stock market data are CRSP value-weighted market returns, daily from 1957 to 2008 and 
monthly from 1925 to 2008.  
For the price of crude oil, I follow literatures and use West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil 
prices from Global Financial Data (GFD). GFD has daily WTI price from 1983 and monthly and 
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quarterly price data from 1859. Since it is not possible to measure the “non-crude oil” 
consumption price, I choose the monthly “CPI_all items less energy” (CPI_nonenergy) data from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) instead. To match smyce of oil and non-oil price data, I also 
download corresponding monthly “CPI_energy” and “CPI_energy commodity” series from BLS. 
All three data series start from 1957. 
Accordingly, the main oil expenditure series used in my empirical study is quarterly expenditure 
of “Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods”, a subcategory in “Non-durable goods” of NIPA 
Table 2.3.5 (Personal Consumption Expenditure by Major Type of Product). In this series, “other 
energy goods” mainly refer to coal. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website shows that 
as of 2005, the total U.S. expenditure on coal is only about 6% of the expenditure on petroleum 
products. The non-oil expenditure data is the “Non-durable goods” plus “Services” expenditure 
minus “Gasoline, fuel oil and other energy goods (coal)”. To allow for different measures of oil/ 
energy expenditure, I also download “Energy goods and services” data from NIPA Table 2.3.5. 
This series includes not only the non-durable consumption expenditures on oil products & coal, 
but also expenditures on electricity and gas services. The expenditure data are all quarterly data 
starting from 1947. 
I find that the “CPI_energy commodity” price series best corresponds to the expenditure series 
“Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods” as well as my definition of “oil” consumption. So 
they are used as benchmark data series of my empirical studies. The price series “CPI_energy” 
are best matched by expenditure series “Energy goods and services”. Later I use these two series 
to examine whether my empirical results are robust to different measures and specifications. It 
turns out that difference in data series has little effect on my estimations. 
The use of energy/non-energy data to “proxy” for crude oil/non-oil data can be well justified. 
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The correlation of the WTI crude oil price series with “CPI_energy commodity” is as high as 
0.96 and correlation with “CPI_energy” is 0.91. This is not surprising since oil is by far the most 
important energy commodity. Energy commodities account for a total of about 75% in the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, while oil alone accounts for 55% of the index. As is pointed 
out by Kilian(2008), oil has such a dominating role in energy sector that the fluctuations in U.S. 
energy expenditure since 1980’s “reflect primarily changes in the crude oil prices rather than 
shift in energy use.”  
The real problem with the downloaded data is the low data frequency: I only have quarterly 
expenditure data and monthly CPI data. While to estimate the dynamic conditional moments in 
an EGARCH-DCC system, I need daily data to ensure as many data points as possible.  
To solve this problem, I resort to the static FOC of the two-good model: 
1( )
o o
t t t
t c c
t t t
p o pz
p c p
e ew -= =               (7*) 
Taking log of both sides, I have: 
    
( )ln ( ) ln (1 ) ln( )
( )
o
c
p tz t
p t
e w e= × + -            (11)    
I estimate the intratemporal elasticity of substitutione  and the constant term from equation (11) 
using quarterly NIPA expenditure data and CPI data. Then proxies for daily CPI series are 
created by regressing “CPI_energy commodity” on WTI crude oil prices. Finally, I use the above 
estimated parameters and the fitted daily price ratio series to construct daily expenditure ratios 
following equation (7*). 
Figure 1.2 shows that the expenditure ratio covaries positively with the price ratio, which 
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suggests a small e  value. Indeed, the estimated value of e  is 0.15, consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that oil and non-oil consumptions are complements. The accuracy of this 
estimation relies on the exogeneity assumption though. One may question that the estimated e  
value is too small due to identification problem. However, this should not be a big concern as the 
exact value of e  is not essential. It is quite far-fetched to claim oil and non-oil consumptions are 
substitutes, and e  value far below 1 should be quite reasonable. 
1.4.2 Empirical Method 
I use daily CPI ratio and expenditure ratio data series described in previous section to estimate 
the conditional moments of stock returns ( sr ) and changes in expenditure ratio ( lnd z , denoted 
by zr ). To do so, I employ a bivariate EGARCH-DCC type of model and maximum likelihood 
estimators (MLE). The model is an equation system of the following form: 
The conditional mean equations are: 
( ) exp( ( )) ( ) , where  is the log of conditional variance of 
( ) exp( ( )) ( ), where  is the log of conditional variance of 
1 ( )
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The conditional variance equations (EGARCH) are: 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
s s s s s s s s s z s z
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The conditional correlation equation (DCC) is: 
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The variance equations capture the asymmetric relation between returns and the volatility 
changes. In particular, coefficients c & e in EGARCH equation represent the magnitude effect: if 
d & f=0, c>0 & e >0, then increase in returns also raises the volatility. Coefficients d & f 
represent the sign effect: if c & e=0, d<0 &f <0, then volatility decrease as returns go up.  
The correlation equation captures the idea that the conditional correlation can be quite volatile 
and even switch sign depending on realized zr  and sr . The monotonic transformation from p to 
r  ensures that value of r (correlation) is between -1 and 1. 
1.4.3 Estimation Results 
I have a total of 19 unknown parameters in the above equation system to estimate. They are 
estimated by MLE. 
The estimated conditional variance equations are: 
( ) 0.90 0.92 ( 1) 13.21 ( 1) 10.63 ( 1) 1.35 ( 1) 1.69 ( 1)
( ) 0.58 0.95 ( 1) 11.36 ( 1) 1.65 ( 1) 0.61 ( 1) 1.09 ( 1)
s s s s z z
z z z z s s
h t h t r t r t r t r t
h t h t r t r t r t r t
= - + - + - - - + - + -
= - + - + - + - + - + -
 
And the estimated conditional correlation equation is: 
( ) 0.0008 0.93 ( 1) 0.57 ( 1) 0.64 ( 1) 124.84 ( 1) ( 1)s z s zp t p t r t r t r t r t= - + - + - - - + - × -  
To evaluate the significance of estimated parameters, I perform likelihood ratio (LR) tests. LR 
test reject the hypothesis that coefficients on zr  terms in sh  equation are zeroes. This suggests 
that oil shocks do have significant impact on the volatility of stock returns: increase in oil/non-oil 
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expenditure ratio caused by sharp upswing in oil price implies higher future returns volatility. On 
the other hand, LR test failed to reject the hypothesis that coefficients on sr  terms in zh  equation 
are zeroes, implying that fluctuations in stock returns do not lead to more volatile oil movements. 
Finally, my LR test on the correlation equation strongly rejects the hypothesis that coefficient on 
either zr  or the cross product term is zero. So changes in oil/non-oil expenditure ratio also have 
significant effects on the correlation. Overall, my estimation and the LR results provide strong 
evidence that oil shocks can be translated into stock market risk.  
We can see from equation (10) that conditional covariance between changes in oil/non-oil 
expenditure ratio and the stock market returns is the key component in the empirical risk premia. 
Figure 1.3 plots the fitted empirical conditional covariance. To identify oil price changes caused 
by exogenous supply shocks, I follow Sørensen(2009) and mark a series of important oil events 
dates: 
At the end of 1985 and in early 1986, the OPEC collapsed when Saudi Arabia abandoned its 
long-time swing producer role and increased production from 2 million barrels per day 
(MMBPD) to 5MMBPD. As a result, the crude oil price plummeted by mid 1986. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing Gulf War resulted in first a spike then a sharp 
fall in crude oil price. From April 2000 to November 2000, OPEC carried out four successive 
huge quota increases to stem the surging oil price. After the last quota increase on Nov. 1, 2000, 
the price eventually took a large downward turn. After the terrorist attack in September 2001, the 
already gradually declining oil price plummeted again. In response, OPEC and several non-
OPEC oil producers including Russia jointly cut their production in January 2002. Their effort 
successfully brought the oil price back up. In March 2003, the breakout of the Iraq War induced 
another big spike in crude oil price. A plot of monthly WTI crude oil prices since 1973 with 
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marked event dates is presented in Appendix. 
Figure 1.3 demonstrates remarkable time-variation in fitted daily conditional covariance between 
expenditure ratio and stock returns. When annualized, the covariance has a magnitude of 1e-2, 
which is reasonable. More interestingly, most of the biggest variations in the covariance coincide 
with the important exogenous oil events above, providing strong supporting evidence for my 
assumption that predictability mainly arises from oil price changes caused by exogenous supply 
shocks.  
How “reliable” are the estimates? To answer, I bin the daily (differenced) expenditure ratios & 
CRSP market returns data from 1983-2008 into months and compute the realized volatility & 
correlation within each month. Then I plot them against the fitted values from the model for 
comparison. 
As is shown in Figure 1.4a & 4b, the fitted volatilities do a good job “replicating” realized 
volatilities. Both volatility series show remarkable time-variation and the patterns of the 
variation match the realized volatilities well. From Figure 1.4c, the fitted correlation series seems 
to have correct direction of movements most of the time. But the magnitude of the variation can 
hardly match that of the realized correlation with only a few exceptions. In terms of picking up 
big oil price variations, the fitted correlation series seem to do a better job for sharp oil price 
increases (such as in 1990, during the first Gulf War and in 2003, during the Iraq War) than for 
large drops in the oil prices. This may imply a need for a more sophisticated model for 
conditional correlation. Bottom line is: my empirical evidence does show strong link between oil 
shocks and time-varying conditional covariance and time-varying risk premia. The empirical 
results and the theory in Section 1.3 suggest a plausible risk-based explanation for the 
predictability of oil. 
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1.4.4 Robustness 
In this section, I examine if my empirical results are robust to different specifications of model 
and different measures of expenditure on oil consumption. Both test results are positive, 
confirming my previous finding of time-varying risk premia. 
Lee et al.(1995) argue that “an oil shock is likely to have greater impact in an environment where 
oil price movement has been stable than …where oil price movement has been frequent and 
erratic”. Following this logic, I scale the oil shock by its conditional volatility and estimate a 
“normalized” bivariate EGARCH-DCC model: I replace sr  and zr  by the standardized residual 
sx  and zx  respectively and estimate the following conditional variance and correlation 
equations: 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
s s s s s s s s s z s z
z z z z z z z z z s z s
h t a b h t c t d t e t f t
h t a b h t c t d t e t f t
x x x x
x x x x
= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -
= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -
 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)p p p s p z p s zp t a b p t c t d t e t tx x x x= + × - + × - + × - + × - × -  
By doing so, I scale up the shocks in a relatively stable period and scale down the shocks in a 
volatile period.  
The fitted conditional volatilities from this normalized model are close to the benchmark (un-
normalized) model in section 1.4.3, while the correlation series (Figure 1.5) actually matches the 
magnitude of realized correlation better than benchmark. As a result, the fitted covariance series 
(Figure 1.6) is more volatile although the major pattern of variation is similar to benchmark 
results. I still see clear time variations, especially during the times of important exogenous oil 
events such as wars in the Middle East and OPEC quota increases/decreases. 
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The second robustness check is to examine whether different expenditure/ price data series 
change my empirical findings.  
In the benchmark case, I build the daily price series based on “CPI_energy commodity” and the 
daily expenditure series based on NIPA “Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods”. As is 
mentioned in section 1.3.1, a second choice of price/expenditure combination is to use 
“CPI_energy” and NIPA “Energy goods and services”. In addition to household spending on oil 
products and coals, NIPA “Energy goods and services” also include expenditure on natural gas 
and electricity services. A third choice of price/expenditure data is the original daily WTI crude 
oil prices and NIPA “Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods”. 
I estimated un-normalized and normalized models for both alternative price/expenditure 
combinations. Figure 1.7a compares the three fitted conditional covariance series from the un-
normalized model and Figure 1.7b compares the fitted covariances from the normalized model. 
The estimations deliver results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the original 
ones. Again, this is not really surprising considering the overwhelming share of oil in the entire 
energy sector.  
In all, my robustness checks consolidate the empirical evidence found in section 1.4.3: Changes 
in oil/non-oil expenditure ratios, especially those caused by exogenous supply shocks to oil 
prices, have significant effects on the volatilities of stock market returns as well as its 
correlations with stock returns. Both the fitted conditional volatilities and conditional 
covariances exhibit remarkable time-variation.  
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1.4.5 Predictability of Oil Shocks 
Driesprong et al.(2008) report that positive oil price changes predict lower stock market returns. 
The predictability is both statistically and economically significant. They claim it is an anomaly 
that can only be interpreted as investors’ underreaction to information. According to them, the 
underreaction occurs when investors have difficulty assessing impact of the oil price changes on 
value of stocks or investors react to information at different points of time. If so, the 
predictability should weaken in industries that oil prices are likely to have first-order impact on. 
This is contradicted by Sørensen(2009), where the author finds evidence that the ICB 
Automobile sector is strongly forecasted in all markets where data are available. Moreover, 
Driesprong et al’s rejection of time-varying risk premia explanation is only based on the 
interpretation of oil price shock as a supply shock to the cost of production. As we have seen in 
the introduction, this is challenged by researchers such as Kilian (2008, 2009) and 
Hamilton(2005) who argue that oil shocks mainly affect the economy through shifts in demand 
for final products. 
My empirical findings, combined with the two-good model, suggest another plausible 
explanation for the reported predictability: it may be a mere reflection of people’s concern about 
the time-varying composite risk, namely, the risk that arises due to the impact of volatile oil 
prices on their consumption pattern. In other words, I observe the predictability from oil price 
changes because the risk premia share similar variation pattern with them. Therefore, if my 
estimates of the empirical risk premia are “accurate” enough, they may help account for the 
predictability of lagged oil price changes. To see if this is the case, I try the following predictive 
regression using monthly data: 
1( ) ( 1) ( )s o tr t r t RP ta b g e-= + × - + × +  
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Where sr  is the CRSP value-weighted market returns; or  is change in WTI crude oil price; and 
RP is the risk premium: 
1 1 1
1 ( 1)( ) cov ( ln ( ), ( )) cov ( ln ( ), ( ))
( 1) (1 ( 1))t t s t s
z tRP t c t r t z t r t
z t
s e
s s e- - -
- -
= D - D
- + -
 
We have shown in section 1.3 that the first term has little variation compared to the second term. 
It is also difficult to estimate the dynamic covariance between stock and non-oil consumption 
since I only have quarterly NIPA consumption data. However, the covariance can be written as 
the products of stock returns volatility ss , consumption growth volatility cs , and correlation 
between stock and consumption growth scr . Since I have estimates of ss , I add it to the 
regression. 
To obtain monthly expected conditional covariances and volatilities, I do 10000 simulations to 
compute the average. In each simulation, I start from the last day of the current month and iterate 
forward using estimated equations to compute the next day value till the end of next month. Then 
the forecasted daily values in each month are summed up to get monthly values. 
The final predictive regression is: 
1
( 1)( ) ( 1) ( 1) cov ( ln ( ), ( ))
(1 ( 1))s o s t s
z tr t r t t z t r t
z t
a b g s d e-
æ ö-
= + × - + × - + × D +ç ÷+ -è ø
 
If the fitted 1cov ( ln ( ), ( ))t sz t r t- D  is “good” enough and the risk-based story holds, then I expect 
to see a significantly negative $d  and   = 0.  
My initial result shows that $d  is significantly negative as expected. However, the coefficient on 
lagged oil price change,   , is also significantly negative. Thus, my current estimated risk premia 
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are not able to explain the observed predictability.  
There are several ways to interpret this result. One possibility is that the predictability is truly an 
anomaly and cannot be explained by time-varying risk premia. A second possibility is that I need 
more sophisticated theoretical or empirical models for the interaction between oil shocks and 
stock market returns. Finally it is quite plausible that measurement errors result in inaccuracy of 
estimations and unfavorable regression results. Given the empirical evidence of time-variation in 
returns moments and the problems I see in my correlation estimations, the latter two 
interpretations seem much more reasonable than the first one. For example, in this paper, I only 
consider oil as final products that can only be consumed. A model where oil can either be 
consumed or used as inputs in producing other consumption goods may be more realistic and 
perform better. Similarly, I notice some problems in estimated conditional correlations that affect 
the accuracy of fitted risk premia. It is quite plausible that a more sophisticated empirical model 
on the correlations can improve the final results.  
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper is motivated by recent studies on the relationship between crude oil price and stock 
market. I try to understanding of the link between the two by addressing the following questions: 
What are the dynamic correlations between oil shocks and stock returns? Can oil shocks be 
translated into stock market risk? Is it possible to provide a rational risk-based explanation for 
some documented stock returns predictability related to oil shock?  
Using a two-consumption good model and U.S. data, I illustrate a mechanism for oil shocks to be 
“converted” into stock market risk. My empirical estimates show that the effects of changes in 
oil/non-oil expenditure ratios on the second moments of stock market returns are significant.  
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I find evidence of remarkable time-variation in both volatilities of stock returns and covariances 
of returns with changes in expenditure ratios. Most of the largest variations coincide with 
important exogenous oil events such as large OPEC quota cuts/increases and military conflicts in 
Middle East. My empirical results and theory shed light on a risk-based explanation for the 
predictability of oil price changes.  
A preliminary predictive regression confirms that my empirical risk premia are strongly 
significant in the predictive regression. However they are not yet able to account for the 
predictability of oil price changes. This does not necessarily mean that time-varying risk 
premium cannot explain the predictability. Combined with the favorable empirical evidence I 
find, it points to the need for better understanding of the interaction between oil shocks & stock 
market risk.  
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CHAPTER 2: INCOME INEQUALITY AND ASSET PRICES: A 
CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
Recently income inequality has received renewed interests globally. It is no longer the concern in 
only those poor countries or emerging economies – the May 2011 report by OECD shows that the 
gap between the rich and poor in wealthy countries has reached its highest level over the past three 
decades, even in the traditionally egalitarian countries such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden. 
It’s been a prevailing view among the policy and academic elites in the past decades that inequality 
itself is a less important issue than poverty. This view has never been challenged before like it is 
challenged nowadays. In America, accompanying the enormous amount of attention on the 
increasing income disparity itself is the heated debate over President Obama’s deficit-reduction 
and tax reforming plan that targets the top income population: The plan includes the “Buffet rule” 
that ensures millionaires to pay no less tax than any middle-class families.  
Such debates on inequality and policy cannot be settled without answering some open questions. In 
particular, what are the effects of the changing inequality and how do we measure them? For 
financial economists, a relevant question is how inequality affects financial market wealth and 
returns to investors. Stock market provides the natural environment for such study, as 
Whitelaw(2000) points out, “…since it (stock market) serves as a proxy for the wealth portfolio 
that is studied in finance theory”. Answering this question is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
directly estimates and quantifies the potential cost or benefit in terms of financial wealth. Thus it 
presents a non-ideological way of evaluating policies that have impacts on income distributions 
(for example, taxations on the rich). Meanwhile, as I discuss in detail later in this section, studying 
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of the effects of income inequality on financial market quantities also has significant implications 
for asset pricing modeling.   
In this paper, I examine the asset pricing implication of income inequality. More precisely, I 
investigate how the variation in cross-country stock market level is related to cross-country 
difference in domestic income distributions. I utilize two of the most up-to-date and complete 
inequality datasets in this study. The main measure of inequality is the income Gini coefficients 
from World Bank’s “All-the-Ginis” dataset. Robustness tests are performed with income Gini and 
income ratios data from World Income Inequality Database version 2.0 (WIID2) assembled by the 
World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER). Many of the earlier empirical 
studies on income suffer from lacking of consistency and reliability in data source. Both datasets 
used in this paper go a long way to address these concerns by careful selections based on 
characteristics of source surveys for the observations and by labeling the welfare concepts. Given 
their partial divergence in initial sources and discrepancy in methods1, income inequality measures 
from both sources are still highly consistent.  
This paper has two main results: Firstly, I document a significant negative correlation between 
income inequality and stock market levels across countries even after controlling for traditional 
price factors and country characteristics. A 0.01 increase in income Gini coefficient is associated 
with up to 2%  lower stock market price dividend ratio, keeping other things constant. This inverse 
relationship is especially notable in the more developed countries. Given the academic consensus 
that domestic income distributions are usually shaped by historical institutional and geographical 
influences, it is unlikely that varying stock market levels across countries contribute to the diversity 
in degree of local income disparities. Even if ups and downs in a country’s stock market are 
                                                          
1 The WIID2 Ginis are mostly calculated from their income decile and quintile data, a method developed the by Tony Shorrocks and 
Guang Hua Wan. When decile/quintile data are not available, WIID2 report Gini values from the compiled sources. 
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reflected in its inequality level, a positive rather than negative (as in my results) correlation should 
be observed: the gap between the rich and the poor usually widens in a booming market, as stocks 
are usually more concentrated in the hands of the wealthier ones. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
interpret the negative correlation documented in this study as the cross-sectional effect of differing 
income inequality levels on stock prices. Secondly, I decompose price dividend ratio into risk-free 
rate and expected excess returns and examine the link between each of the components with 
inequality. I find that increasing inequality lowers prices mainly by raising interest rates, while 
there is no evidence that inequality is positively related to excess returns. This is an interesting yet 
intriguing result, as it poses challenge to the existing asset pricing literature to explain the 
mechanism behind.  
The topic in this paper is related to several distinct research areas of economics and finance.  
Firstly, a large body of development economic research (see, among others, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic(1990), Clarke, Xu and Zou(2006), Beck and Levine(2004),  Beck et al(2007), 
Kappel(2010)) focuses on the role of financial developments,  including development in banking 
system and stock market,  in reducing income inequality, poverty rates and improving the life of 
the poor. Another line of research is devoted to the macroeconomic implications of income 
inequality, including the interaction between inequality and economic growth, consumption and 
savings. For example, Galor and Zeira(1993), Benabou(1996a), Barro(2000), Krueger and 
Perri(2006), and Heathcote et al(2010) develop different theoretical models to investigate the effect 
of diverse income distributions on growth, on investment and consumption. There doesn’t seem to 
be a consensus reached by these theories though. And the theoretical ambiguities do seem to 
correspond to divergence in empirical findings, as can be seen from Perotti(1996), Forbes(2000), 
Li and Zou(2004), Krueger and Perri(2006) and Heathcote et al(2010).  
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While my paper draws from these development and macroeconomic literatures in their empirical 
settings, it is more inspired and linked more closely in spirit to the enormous asset pricing 
literatures that aspire to solve anomalies such as equity premium puzzle. Before proceeding any 
further, however, it is probably worth clarifying that the focus of this study is how differing 
inequality LEVELS are associated with stock prices and asset returns. A related but distinct study 
can be seen in Johnson(2012), where the author ties differing exposure to inequality RISK with 
difference in returns.   
Now coming back to the asset pricing literature that relates to my paper, the first question to 
answer is: “When do income distributions matter for asset pricing?” 
Under the standard classic assumptions of frictionless, complete market and homogeneous agents 
with CRRA utilities, only the mean of income or wealth, not their distribution, matters for asset 
prices. However, this type of models fails to generate risk premia that match magnitudes of the 
observed data. It is therefore necessary to relax one or more of these assumptions to solve equity 
premium puzzle. To do so, the existing literature has experimented in a couple directions.  
One way is to maintain the complete market assumption and to loosen other assumptions. 
Gollier(2001) for example, maintains the complete market and removes the CRRA preference 
assumption. He shows that if agents have concave absolute risk tolerance (the inverse of Arrow-
Pratt absolute risk aversion), then deviation from an egalitarian income (initial wealth) distribution 
increases the equity premium and lowers risk-free rate.  
The other way is to relax the complete market or frictionless transaction assumptions:  
For instance, Peress(2004) follows this second road by assuming costly acquisition of the 
information that generates increasing returns. With decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, 
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the demand in stocks is convex in wealth. As a result, higher inequality leads to higher stock prices, 
and this in turn, contributes to more unequal income distribution and wealth accumulation. 
Besides Peress’s paper, a thriving branch of literature also takes the second route to answer major 
asset pricing questions by combining incomplete market models with heterogeneous agents2. In 
some of these models, incomplete market results from aggregate and idiosyncratic income risks, 
and lacking of or limited access to credit market (borrowing constraints etc.). If idiosyncratic risk is 
correlated with aggregate risk either by explicit assumption (Constantinides and Duffie(1996), 
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron(2007)) or by construction (Guo(2004), Gomes and 
Michaelides(2008)), then the model can deliver higher risk premium and lower risk-free rate due to 
precautionary motive3.  Another strand of models adopts a different mechanism but has similar 
elements including market frictions, uninsurable income risks and heterogeneity. The key 
ingredient of this type of models is limited stock market participation. The source of this limitation 
can either be exogenous (Basak and Cuoco(1998), Guo(2004), Guvenen(2009)) or endogenous due 
to frictions like an entry cost (Gomes and Michaelides(2008)). The magnitude of fixed costs to 
entering stock market and their effects on market participation have been estimated in several 
empirical studies (see, for example, Paiella(2001) and Vissing-Jørgensen(2002)). Limited stock 
market participation leads to limited risk sharing among shareholders. Consequently, consumptions 
of stockholders are more volatile and more correlated with aggregate risk compared to those of the 
non-stockholders. Therefore stockholders require higher risk premium to hold stocks. Several 
recent papers (Guo(2004), Gomes and Michaelides(2008) and Favilukis(2013)) incorporate both 
                                                          
2 See Heathcote et al.(2009) for  an excellent survey of macroeconomic models with heterogeneous households. 
3 Telmer(1993), Heaton and Lucas(1996), and Krusell and Smith(1997)’s models also have elements such as incomplete market, 
idiosyncratic risks, borrowing constraints and heterogeneity. However, their models fail to generate desired risk premia mainly 
because their models assume that individual heterogeneity is independent of the aggregate risk. In a sense, Polkovnichenko(2004)’s 
model, although relying on a very different mechanism (limited participation), is quite similar to these models in that he assumes 
agents derive a substantial part of their wealth from labor income which is uncorrelated with dividends. Like Lucas et al, 
Polkovnichenko also reaches the conclusion that equity premium puzzle cannot be solved by his type of model. 
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mechanisms from the two strands into one model and are able to partially match equity premium 
and risk-free rate, as well as replicating several other salient features of the data.  
At the first glance, with the exception of Favilukis(2013), few of the models discussed above have 
explicitly integrated income inequality or directly linked it to returns and prices. However, there 
are a couple of reasons why it is not much of a stretch to place income distributions in asset pricing 
models as a state variable.  
First of all, the indispensable ingredient shared by all of these models is the heterogeneity in either 
the initial wealth distribution of the economy or idiosyncratic income shocks, or both. And these 
ingredients are exactly where the income inequality originates from. Secondly, given both 
theoretical and empirical studies of income distribution in the growth literature, it is reasonable to 
propose that variation in income distributions have asset pricing implication through its effects on 
the investment and savings. To see this, one can consider the social political channel. The social 
discontent fueled by widened income gaps may create increasing political instability, driving the 
entire social economic environment into uncertainty and reducing investment. More importantly, 
as Barro(2000) points out, “With limited access to credit, the exploitation of investment 
opportunities depends on individuals’ levels of assets and incomes. Speciﬁcally, poor households 
tend to forego human-capital investments that offer relatively high rates of return …An offsetting 
force arises if investments require setup costs...If these kinds of setup costs are large in relation to 
median income, then a reduction in inequality tends to reduce overall investment. ” These 
arguments can be easily seamed into the incomplete market models discussed before. With all 
these in mind, it is not too hard to see why income distribution should be put into the asset pricing 
picture. However, as far as I know, there has not been a theory that explicitly incorporates 
inequality and models its price impact, and nor has there been any related empirical work done. 
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My paper adds to the asset pricing literature by filling this blank and advances literature in two 
significant ways: To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to perform direct empirical 
tests of inequality effects on the stock market level of a country and to quantify the magnitude of 
the asset pricing effect of income inequality. It is also the first attempt to break down the price 
impact of inequality and empirically explore the underlying mechanism. From modeling 
perspective, the finding of a significant negative correlation between income inequality and stock 
market level provides strong evidence justifying the integration of heterogeneity in asset pricing 
models. Moreover, the observed significant positive correlation between interest rate and 
inequality can hardly be explained by any available model and therefore points to the need of a 
new theory. From the policy point of view, a conclusion of this research is that policies that lead to 
increased income inequality are expected to decrease stock market wealth. The effect is both 
statistically and economically significant: On average an increment of 0.01 in income Gini 
coefficient, or 1% in the income ratio of the top income decile population to the total of other 
deciles, is associated with up to 2% drop in the stock market wealth. Hence if the proposed policy 
results in a reduction in income inequality on the other hand, it is significantly beneficial in terms 
of wealth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the methodology, data 
and variable selection and construction. Section 2.3 presents the empirical results on the 
relationship between income inequality and stock market levels. Section 2.4 performs robustness 
tests. Section 2.5 looks into the main channel for inequality to influence price. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
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2.2 Methodology and Data 
In this section, I discuss the methodology of this study and describe the data sources as well as the 
construction of key variables used in regressions. 
2.2.1 Main Specification and Identification 
In the classic models with frictionless endowment economy and power utility, the dividend price 
ratio can be simply written as: 
  =   +   −   =  + ( − 1)  − 1/2( − 1)     
In this expression,    =  +    − 1/2( + 1)     is the risk-free rate and   =      is the 
expected excess rate of return (equity premium).    is the growth rate of aggregate consumption 
(as well as dividend) and     the volatility of aggregate consumption.   represents the rate of time 
preference.    is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
This representation shows that in this endowment economy, variations in price dividend ratio are 
mainly driven by changes in growth rate and risk of aggregate consumption (or dividend). Based 
on this, in the simplest version of the regression model with P/D ratio as dependent variable, the 
two main independent variables should be dividend growth rate and stock market volatility. 
However, this type of frictionless homogeneous economy models falls short both in matching the 
observed individual portfolio choices and in matching the empirical asset pricing moments. 
Therefore, various frictions have since been introduced into asset pricing theory to generate more 
realistic results. In empirical study, the set of control variables of regressions based on these 
models should be expanded accordingly. 
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In this paper, my main hypothesis is that cross-sectional differences in income distributions have 
implications for the pattern of cross-sectional prices and returns. As discussed in the introduction, 
this hypothesis is based on a prospering body of incomplete market models with heterogeneous 
agents and market frictions. So the basic specification of my regression with panel data is as 
follows: 
log (  )  =    +               +   ℎ           +     
A couple of important issues about this specification need to be addressed before proceeding.  
First and foremost, a crucial underlying assumption of this study is that the market is not fully 
integrated or complete internationally: None of the domestic or local factors should matter in a 
globally integrated complete market; only when there is some degree of international market 
segmentation can home-country characteristics like income inequality play a role in the domestic 
asset pricing. Fortunately, this assumption is consistent with the known fact that the world market 
is indeed segmented, even with the growing globalization in the last few decades. A related issue is 
that not only does the degree of segmentation of each country from the global market itself have 
impact on home country’s stock market; it also affects the weightiness of inequality and other 
domestic factors’ influence on the domestic market. Specifically, domestic factors play bigger role 
in determining domestic prices if the home country is more segregated from the world market. I 
account for effects of global market segmentation in my regressions and present more detailed 
discussions in section 3.3. 
A second issue is about endogeneity and reverse causality. In the regression model specified above, 
the income inequality needs to be viewed as exogenous. Two main concerns are the omitted 
variable problem and measurement errors in inequality. To address the former concern, I first 
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include year-fixed effects in every regression to control for changes in unobserved factors over 
time. Then I control for an extensive and comprehensive list of country characteristics that are 
likely to contribute to both the difference in cross-country inequality levels and variation in cross-
country stock market levels. These controls cover each country’s social-political condition and 
stability, indicators of economic and financial market development, institutions and taxation, as 
well as proxy of degree of domestic market’s segregation from global market. To deal with the 
concern on measurement error, I employ alternative inequality measures obtained from two distinct 
sources that contain latest and highest quality income data. My empirical results are significant in 
almost all regressions and highly consistent across alternative inequality measures. To the extent 
that both endogeneity concerns are properly addressed, it is also always necessary to interpret the 
regression coefficients with caution. Can the estimated correlation be viewed as causal effect of 
income distributions on prices? In this study, the answer is “yes” and it can be justified by two 
arguments. It is firstly worth pointing out that income distribution is usually the long-term outcome 
of slow-moving historical, institutional and social-economic forces that are generally not affected 
by stock market prices. Hence it is unlikely that stock prices have any substantial effect on income 
inequality. In the short-run, fluctuating market level of a country may temporarily drive a change 
in the domestic income distribution. If this is the case, the rich (who are usually also the higher-
income population) benefit the most from a booming market since they generally hold the most 
stocks. So a higher stock market level is most likely coupled by larger wedge between high- and 
low-income populations and higher income inequality. In other words, inequality and market level 
should be positively correlated if the latter is driving the former. Yet my regressions reveal a 
significant negative correlation between the two variables, thus provide strong evidence against the 
reverse causality interpretation. 
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It is probably also worth discussing the focus of this paper on identifying the cross-country effect 
of inequality on asset prices. Cross-sectional correlations are a natural candidate for this study and 
suit the purpose better than time-series effects for two reasons. A first reason is that it is hard to 
match the frequencies of changes in the two time-series since inequality series over time are much 
smoother compared to the price series. As a result, it is difficult to interpret results of time-series 
regressions and draw any conclusion on the equilibrium effect of inequality on price. The other 
reason lies in the limitation of the obtained data itself. The data on income inequality are only 
available for a relatively small set of country-years and are distributed quite sporadically, resulting 
in a highly unbalanced wide panel dataset. Both of the final datasets of income Gini coefficients 
for my regressions contain a little over 500 observations, spreading across over 40 countries. The 
final dataset of the WIID2 income deciles for regressions contain less than 400 observations across 
40 countries. In view of this, cross-country differences in inequality are also a more natural and 
reliable source of variation than the time-series variation for this dataset. To better identify the 
cross-sectional effect of income inequality on market prices, I employ model with year-fixed effect 
and use cluster-corrected standard errors for inference in all regressions. 
In the following sub-sections, I discuss in detail the data sources, selection and construction of the 
main independent variable (income inequality), dependent variable (stock market level) and main 
control variables. 
2.2.2 Income Inequality Measures 
The main measure of income inequality in my regressions is the income Gini coefficient. Gini is 
one of the most commonly used measures of income inequality in the literature. Constructed based 
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on Lorenz curve4, it measures the income inequality on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 representing the 
perfect equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 representing the perfect inequality (one 
person have all the income).  The Gini values are commonly multiplied by 100 to make them 
easier to compare and understand. In this paper, I follow this convention and use 100*Gini (a value 
between 0 and 100) instead of the original Gini coefficient values. The income data in this paper 
are obtained from two sources: the “All-the-Ginis” dataset compiled by Branko Milanovic from 
World Bank and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID2) dataset of World Instituted of 
Development Economic Research (WIDER). 
My main results are obtained using the “All-the-Ginis” dataset, which contains 1541 consistent 
Gini values from 154 countries covering 1950 to 2008.  The dataset is compiled from 5 other Gini 
databases, including Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Socio-Economic Database for Latin 
America (SEDLAC), World Income Distribution (WYD), World Bank Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) and WIDER (WIID I ) databases. Only the data that come from nationally-representative 
household survey are selected. When there is conflict in data from two or more different sources 
for the same country-year, data are chosen according to the reliability and the degree of 
standardization of the source. All the data in the resulted “All-the-Ginis” dataset have clear 
description of welfare concepts (income or expenditure/consumption, net or gross) and unit of 
receipients (per capita or per household). Compared to some other sources of income distribution 
data, “All-the-Ginis” has advantage in both the size of the samples and the overall consistency of 
the concepts and measurements. And all the data in my sample are estimated in per capita units. 
                                                          
4 The Lorenz curve plots cumulative percentage of income or expenditure (from 0 to 100 on vertical axis) against the cumulative 
percentage of the population (from 0 to 100 on horizontal axis). Under perfectly equal distribution, the Lorenz curve is a 45-degree 
straight line; the more inequal the income or expenditure distribution, the further the Lorenz curve falls away from and skewed to the 
right of the 45-degree line. Gini coefficient is 2 times the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. 
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Another important source of inequality data, used in my robustness checks, is the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID2) dataset of World Institute of Development Economic Research 
(WIDER). This data is one of the largest and most comprehensive dataset on income distribution, 
built on the WIID1 dataset but with substantial extension. It is widely used by development 
economists.  It has Gini coefficients as well as income deciles data and provides great alternative 
measures of inequality to those from “All-the-Ginis”. Since WIID2 is based on a large amount of 
data sources, there is big variation in the reliability, the definitions and descriptions. WIID2 data 
are ranked from 1 to 4 by the quality of the data, with 1 being the highest quality (with clear 
description on all key concepts and verifiable estimates) and 4 being the lowest (observations 
classified as memorandum items). The statistical units adopted in WIID2 are all adjusted to the 
equivalence scale of per capita value to account for the differences in household size and 
composition. 
Besides using Gini coefficients directly, I construct another measure of inequality with the income 
decile data from WIID2: the ratio of the income of the population in the highest income decile to 
the total income of the other 90% of the population. This income ratio measure is also a popular 
measure of inequality in economic research.  
For WIID2 data, a first step is to eliminate observations that are based on regional surveys and 
surveys conducted only on certain groups of the population. Then following Campante and 
Do(2007), I extract data with the top quality ranking (ranked 1 or 2) so that the key descriptions of 
all observations are available for comparison to the ones in “All-the-Ginis”. 
As with most survey data, both “All-the-Ginis” and the WIID2 data suffer from lacking of 
consistency in the concepts adopted in estimation. There are two main concerns here: Whether the 
estimates of Ginis are based on income or consumption (expenditure); similarly, whether the 
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estimates are based on gross or net income (net income is defined as income net of tax and 
transfers).  
To address these concerns, I follow Dollar and Kraay(2002) and adjust both datasets to ensure the 
consistency in welfare concepts. I regress the inequality measures on a constant, a set of regional 
dummies5 and two dummy variables indicating whether the measure is based on gross income or 
consumption. Then I subtract the estimated mean difference between the alternative welfare 
concepts-based inequality measures and the omitted category6. The adjusted Gini coefficients for 
regressions can be roughly interpreted as a measure of the disparity in net (disposable) income. 
The descriptive statistics of the income inequality measures can be seen in Table 2.1, Panel A. The 
correlations are shown in Table 2.2. 
A quick look at the Table1 shows substantial variations in income inequality across countries. Gini 
from “All-the-Ginis” varies from 23.35 (Czech Republic) to 60.49 (South Africa). WIID2 Gini 
varies from 22.07 (Czech Republic) to 59 (South Africa). The proportion of the income accrued to 
the richest 10% people relative to the other 90% people, WIID2 IR, is also the lowest in Czech 
Republic (0.23) and highest in Brazil (0.89), followed by some other Latin American countries. 
Consistent with common belief, less economically developed countries tend to have greater income 
inequality and most developed countries have a more equal income distribution. Overall, despite 
the variation in data sources and possible differences in the construction process, the three 
alternative income inequality variables have fairly consistent cross-country rankings, although the 
income ratios have more pronounced values for the most unequal countries.  The correlation 
                                                          
5 The dummies are Asia, Africa, Latin America, and East Europe. The others (“West” countries) are in the omitted category. 
6 My main results do not change much if I use other two possibilities: 1. Completely ignoring the differences in welfare concepts, 
and 2. Include the dummy variables of welfare concepts directly in regressions. 
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between the two Gini measures is 0.912 and their correlations with the cross-country income ratio 
are 0.943 and 0.953, respectively. 
2.2.3 Stock Market Level 
The focus of this paper is to examine the link between inequality and asset prices. Therefore the 
main dependent variable is the stock market level, as measured by price dividend ratio of each 
country. I obtain stock market data from both MSCI and Global Financial Data (GFD) and 
construct alternative measures of price dividend ratios.   
For each country-year, MSCI P/D ratio is the value of MSCI Global Equity Price Index scaled by 
dividend. The price indices cover 25 developed countries/regions (for most of which data series 
begin from 1969) and 20 emerging markets (for which data start from 1987 or 1992).  For each 
country, the standard index covers all investable large and mid-cap securities, accounting for about 
85% of the market capitalization.   
An alternative measure of stock market level, the inverse of annual dividend yield of each country 
from Global Financial Data (GFD) between 1970 and 2010, is used to check the robustness of the 
regression results. These dividend yields are generally based the large-cap stocks that represent 
about 75% of the market capitalization.  
The last two columns of Table 2.1 Panel A report the annual average values of the two price 
dividend ratios by country. There are substantial international variations in both series. MSCI P/D 
values range from 19.79 in New Zealand to 138.29 in Russian Federation; GFD P/D is the lowest 
in Australia at 21.91and the highest in Russian Federation with a 106.12 value. The average 
correlation between MSCI and GFD PD ratios across country and over time is 0.516, as shown in 
Table 2.2.  
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2.2.4 Other Risk Proxies and Control Variables 
The choice of the control variables are based the following two considerations: As in any cross-
country study, there are potentially substantial omitted variable problems and possibly mis-
measurements. The coverage of the selected controls thus needs to be comprehensive enough that 
they are able to best solve or mitigate these problems. On the other hand, due to relatively limited 
data on income inequality, the panel data used in this study is highly unbalanced and sparse. From 
this perspective, including too many controls significantly reduces the power and reliability of 
regressions. To achieve the balance between the two considerations and best isolate the connection 
between inequality and stock price, I draw from the extant literature and control for a multitude of 
conventional price determinants, risk proxies and time-variant or –invariant country-speciﬁc 
variables that may simultaneously affect stock market level and the income distribution. 
Firstly I include the conventional variables that are shown in literature (Campbell and 
Shiller(1988) etc.) to be closely related to the variation in the price dividend ratios. These variables 
include the dividend growth (past, present and future), real interest rate, and inflation rate. The 
annual dividends are calculated using MSCI equity price and total returns indices. Inflation rate 
data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of World Bank. Interest rate data, 
including the lending (prime) rates and spreads between prime rates and T-bill rates, are also from 
WDI. 
In addition, the cross-country difference in stock prices may also reflect the difference in aggregate 
market risk. To capture this, I control for the market volatility of each country in all regressions. 
The variable is constructed with monthly MSCI equity price index data. Each year it’s computed as 
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the volatility of the market’s index returns over the 36-months window centering on the 
December7. 
The baseline regression thus includes a measure of inequality and the above variables. However, 
what we observe from the coeffiecient of inequality in this regression may simply be proxying for 
the social economic conditions that are shaping the inequality. To disentangle these effects, I 
expand the baseline regression to control for a set of variables that may be simultaneously related 
to both inequality and stock price. In doing so, I borrow from both finance and development 
economics literature to consider all variables that characterize a country’s economic conditions and 
financial market development, demographic features, redistribution policy, the soundness of the 
legal institutions as well as other risk factors including political stability. Table 2.1 Panel B reports 
the country-by-country mean values of these control variables over the sample period and Table 
2.2 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the entire panel. 
Annual GDP per Capita (real) from WDI database is used as an indicator of economic 
development. The negative correlations between GDP per Capita and three inequality measures (-
0.444, -0.485 and -0.568, respectively) in Table2 confirm the common belief that high inequality is 
usually associated with a backward economy. To capture the development in financial markets, I 
follow Beck et al(2000), Beck and Levine(2004),  and many other development papers to measure 
the stock market development by turnover ratio (stturnover) and the banking system development 
by ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (llgdp). Stturnover is the value of the trades of shares on 
domestic exchanges divided by total value of listed shares, a measure of market liquidity. Liquid 
liabilities are calculated as currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities financial 
intermediaries and nonbank financial intermediaries. These data are obtained from Beck, 
                                                          
7 I’ve also tried calculating the volatility over 36-month window centering on each June. The difference in the construction of 
volatility doesn’t affect the regression results. 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (BKL)’s Database of Financial Development and Structure, an updated 
version of Beck et al.(2000).  
It is widely believed that income inequality is usually associated with lacking legal institutions and 
political and social instability. Recent studies on law and finance8 also present convincing evidence 
linking stock market valuation to these factors. In light of these, I created two country-fixed effect 
variables “legal” and “icrg10” as proxies for development of legal regime and overall political 
risk. I follow Doidge et al.(2007) and Durnev &Kim(2005) and define “legal” as the product of 
“anti-director rights index” and “rule-of-law”. The former measures investor protection and 
shareholder rights and the data is from Djankov et al.(2008); the latter are measures of law 
enforcement from (La Porta et al.(1998)).  “icrg10” is a composite country risk index from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that incorporates a comprehensive list of political and 
social condition measures9. 
Another factor that’s shown in literature to be related to both stock returns (Ang and 
Maddaloni(2005), Porterba(2001), etc.) and income distribution (Gomez et al.(2003)) is the age 
structure of a country, especially the fraction of retired people among entire population. I therefore 
include the variable “age65” in the regressions to account for the demographic effects. The 
variable is calculated as the fraction of the population that’s 65 years or older. 
Finally I also take into account the tax rate of each country. Needless to say, taxation policy plays 
an important role in shaping the income distribution of a country. Studies on the effect of tax rates 
on portfolio choice and asset prices have produced mixed results. Still, in order to isolate as much 
                                                          
8 Most of the research show that legal regimes are associated with corporate governance, firm valuations (La Port et al.(1998, 2002), 
Durnev and Kim(2005), Doidge et al.(2007), Djankov et al(2008)) and expected stock market returns (Giannetti and 
Koskinen(2010)). 
9 Specifically, the ICRG composite risk index incorporates the following measures: government stability, military in politics, 
socioeconomic conditions, religious tensions, investment profile, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, external conflict, democratic 
accountability, corruption and bureaucracy quality. 
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as possible the effect of inequality alone, I control for each country’s tax rate in regressions. For 
each country, I choose the marginal personal income tax rate for the highest-income tier. 
Compared to average tax rate, it is more relevant since it reduces the gap between the richest and 
the others. The rates are cited from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. 
Table 2.1 Panel B presents the summary statistics of the above control variables, with some 
outliners excluded10. Table 2.2 reports statistics over the entire panel and the correlations. 
 
2.3 Does Income Inequality Affect Stock Market Level? 
In this section, I test the effect of income inequality on stock market level using panel regressions. 
To better identify the cross-country effect of income distribution on stock markets, I incorporate 
year-fixed effects in all the regressions. Since each country typically has more than one 
observation in the sample, it is also important to consider speciﬁcations with error clustering at the 
country level. All the results reported in this paper are cluster-robust statistics. Empirical results 
obtained with different price dividend ratio measures will be presented and discussed in the first 
part of this section. In the second part I discuss the implication of global market segmentation on 
this empirical study. 
2.3.1 MSCI price dividend ratio and “All-the-Ginis”  
I first use log MSCI price dividend ratio as the dependent variable and Giniall as main independent 
variable. The basic specification is as follows: 
                                                          
10 For example, Brazil has an average real interest rate of 52.58% and a whopping inflation rate of 403.19% over some sample 
periods; Peru also has an extremely negative average interest rate of -185.93% over time once accounting for the huge inflation rate 
of 270%. I exclude country-years with an inflation rates that’s above 100%. My tests show that the inclusion of these “outliners” in 
regressions actually makes my results stronger. 
42 
 
      , =   +   ∗            , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
Where       ,  is the logarithm of price dividend ratio (here it is constructed using MSCI equity 
price and total returns index) of country i in year t.            ,  is a measure of income 
inequality in each country i at in year t.   ,  are a set of country- and time-variant control variables 
including dividend growth, market volatility, the economic (GDP per Capita, inflation, real interest 
rate) and financial market development indicators(stturnover, llgdp)11 and demographics (age65).   ’s are country- fixed institutional factors (legal, tax) and composite political risk factor (icrg10).       is the year-fixed effect. 
With this specification, I test the relationship between log MSCI P/D ratio and the Giniall alone 
and in combination with the various control variables described above. The panel regression results 
are reported in Table 2.3, under Model 1, 2, 4 and 6. Throughout this paper, t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
I start with a simple regression in Model 1 to establish that the log P/D ratio is negatively 
correlated with income inequality, as measured by Giniall. The estimated correlation is about -
0.02, significant at 1% significance level (t = -2.82). Then in Model 2, I add in the “traditional” 
factors that may impact price dividend ratio besides Giniall. These factors are dividend growth, 
real interest rate, inflation rate, and the market volatility proxying for aggregate stock market risk 
of each economy. The inclusions of these factors together helps explaining an extra of about 17% 
of the variation in log P/D ratios across 41 countries. The coefficient on Giniall is still negative and 
                                                          
11 Some development economists consider the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP as an alternative indicator of stock 
market development to stturnover. It is also common to use an alternative variable “private credit”, defined as the bank claims on 
the private sector divided by GDP, to proxy for bank development. I experiment with both sets of indicators and find no 
noticeable effect on my main regressions results and conclusions. Therefore in this paper I only report regressions with stturnover 
and llgdp. 
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significant at 10% level (t= -1.84). The estimates and t-stats also confirm the systematic 
correlations between these factors and P/D ratios established in previous literature. We see a 
significantly negative coefficient on real interest rate (t= -3.01), consistent with conventional 
wisdom in literature. The significantly positive estimate of coefficient on expected dividend 
growth (0.27, with t= 4.5) is expected as in works related to present value models. The finding of a 
big and statistically significantly (t= 2.72) coefficient on market volatility confirms the results in a 
series of recent empirical and theoretical studies12.  
After firstly establishing the inverse relationship between price dividend ratio and inequality with a 
small set of traditional price factors, I gradually include more controls to examine if this correlation 
is only proxying for the cross-country difference in social economic environment and variant 
country characteristics. The influence of economic and financial market development, legal 
institutions and composite political risks are considered in Model 4. In Model 6 the demographic 
features and tax rate are also added to the regression. In Model 4 the t-stat of Giniall coefficient (t= 
-1.97) is right about the 5% significance level. It is even larger (t= -2.72) in Model 6 when the 
effects of age structure13 and tax rate are also accounted for. Therefore it seems reasonable to 
conclude that across countries, higher income dispersion does seem to be associated with lower 
stock market levels. The negative relation is statistically significant and robust even if we take into 
account the effects a variety of other country-specific factors14. 
                                                          
12 See, among others, Whitelaw(2000), Bekaert and Wu(2000) and Li et al.(2005). 
13 As shown in Table2, the demographics variable (age65) is highly correlated with GDP per Capita. To address the multi-
collinearity concern, I compute variance inflation factor (VIF) in regressions with both variables. The outcomes show that there is 
no multicollinearity problem with these regressions. 
14 Some researches show that income inequality may be associated with the average education level of a country. Education 
(financial literacy) is also shown to be related to stock market participation and therefore risk sharing (see, for example, Hong et 
al(2004), Rooij et al(2011)). In untabulated regressions, I also include a proxy for average education level of each country. The 
variable education is measured by Barro-Lee’s data on average years of secondary schooling received by people of age 15years 
and above. The data are obtained from World Bank. The addition of this variable does not affect my main results and conclusions 
and in most regressions it is insignificant. 
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It’s also important to look at the magnitude of this correlation and assess the economic significance 
of inequality on prices. In Model 6 where all the country characteristics and economic factors are 
considered, the estimate of the coefficient on Giniall is about -0.02. It means that on average, 1 
point increase in Giniall (or a 0.01 increase in original income Gini coefficient15) translate into 2% 
drop in market level (P/D). Hence 1 standard deviation change in Giniall (9.046) implies an 
18.09% variation in the market. Take the extreme case of moving from one of the most equal 
countries Czech Republic (with a Gini of 23.35 percent points) to one of the most unequal 
countries South Africa (with a Gini of 60.49 percent points), this change in Gini alone accounts for 
a huge drop of 74% in the market when keeping other things constant. Therefore the inverse 
relationship between income inequality and stock prices is not only significant in the statistical 
sense, but of really substantial economic importance. 
How should we interpret this negative correlation? In general, a correlation cannot be concluded as 
a one-way causal relationship. However, in this case it is reasonable to see the observed correlation 
as reflecting the impact of income inequality on price. As discussed in the introduction, it is 
unlikely that cross-country pattern of income distributions in the long run can be attributed to 
cross-country difference in their stock market performances. Even if in short term fluctuation in a 
country’s stock market can cause a temporary change in the allocation of income or wealth, it 
should induce a positive rather than negative correlation between the two: people who gain the 
most from a bull market are usually the wealthier ones, who already hold a larger amount of stocks 
relative to the poorer guys. Consequently, the rich get richer and the poor stay the same or 
relatively worse off. In other words, if inequality is affected by stock market and not the other way 
                                                          
15 Note that the variables Giniall and WIID2 Gini used in regression analysis are the original Gini coefficient (which is between 0 
and 1) multiplied by 100. WIID2 IR (income ratio) is also multiplied by 100 to be consistent with Gini measures. 
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around, we should observe positive correlation between the market level and inequality, not 
negative as in the results in Table 2.3. 
Developed countries and emerging markets not only differ substantially in economic environment, 
but also in their financial system, political condition and institutional structures. Given all these 
discrepancies, it is natural to ask whether the income dispersion also has distinct effects on market 
index price dividend ratio for the two types of economy. To answer, I re-run Model 2, 4, 6 but with 
an extra control variable: the interaction term of Giniall and a dummy variable indicating whether 
the country is developed or developing country.  This dummy Developed is equal to 1 if the 
country of interest is classified as a “developed market” by MSCI and it is 0 if the country is 
classified by MSCI as an “Emerging market”16. The regression equation is as follows: 
      , =   +   ∗            , +   ∗          , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
In this equation, all other variables are defined the same way as in the previous equation.           ,  is the product of Giniall and the dummy variable Developed. 
The estimates and t-statistics are presented in Table 2.3, under columns titled Model 3, 5 and 7, 
respectively. Interestingly, the results show strong negativity of the coefficient on the interaction 
term. In Model 5 and Model 7 where more control variables are included, the t-stats on this 
coefficient are -2.61 and -2.76, respectively. It means that the negative relationship between market 
price and income disparity is more pronounced in developed countries than in under-developed 
countries. 
                                                          
16 I also try defining developed country to be the ones which have higher per Capita GDP than the sample media per Capita GDP. 
This definition yields the same outcome as MSCI’s country classification. 
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The results show that income distributions do matter for prices and thus provide support for the 
asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents. For example, the finding that inequality matters 
even more in the developed countries than developing countries are consistent with the limited 
stock market participation models. In these models, part of the population is restricted from 
entering stock market because of either borrowing constraints or a fixed entry cost. The larger the 
fraction of restricted population, the more limited the risk sharing, and the higher the risk premia 
required by stockholders to compensate for higher individual consumption risk. If the increase in 
risk premia is big enough, then stock prices are lowered even if risk-free rates drop. Income 
distribution plays a role here because the participating rate is related to the relative size of the fixed 
cost (relative to both the mean and median income). In a developed country where average income 
is relatively high, greater equality means a larger fraction of people are rich enough to pay for the 
threshold fee and invest in stocks; while in an under-developed country where average income is 
sufficiently low, egalitarian income allocation may lead to non-participation since everyone is so 
equally poor. Hence inequality may actually improve the participation rate in this case, as at least 
the small fraction of those at the tip-top of the income distribution can afford buying stocks. 
Therefore, inequality can serve as a proxy for participation rate and degree of risk sharing. And we 
expect inequality to have a stronger effect on stock market in developed countries than in 
developing countries.  Since this type of models implies lower P/D via higher risk premia in higher 
inequality countries (especially the developed ones), I’ll further test whether this theory indeed 
matches the excess returns data in section 2.5.1. 
2.3.2 GFD Price Dividend Ratio and “All-the-Ginis” 
In this section, I test the relationship between an alternative measure of each country’s stock 
market level and income Gini. The dependent variable is the inverse of annual dividend yield from 
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Global Financial Data (GFD). The estimates are presented in in Table 2.4. Cluster-corrected t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  
In Model 1, 2, 4 and 6, GFD price dividend ratio decreases significantly in the inequality measure 
Giniall, even after controlling for a variety of socioeconomic and institutional measures. The 
estimates of coefficients on Giniall are comparable in magnitude to the estimates obtained with 
MSCI price dividend ratios. In addition, Model 3, 5 and 7 in Table 2.4 also confirm the significant 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between Giniall and Developed. 
Regressions with GFD price dividend ratio provide reinforcing evidence that the stock market 
levels across countries are strongly and negatively related to the international variation in income 
Gini, especially in developed countries.  
2.3.3 Local Risk Sharing vs. Global Risk Sharing 
Even with the increasing globalization, the world market is far from fully integrated. Literatures 
have shown that there are still substantial differences in the cross-country degree of market 
integration, resulting in big variation in levels of global risk sharing. Depending on how integrated 
a country is from the global market, the impact of domestic factors (e.g. domestic income 
distributions) on domestic stock market also varies. Therefore, in this section I test if observed 
negative correlation between inequality and market P/D persists after controlling for degrees of 
global risk sharing. 
I use two measures of global market integration/segmentation: foreign investability (FB) and home 
bias (HB). The former measures how easy the foreign investors can invest in domestic market, and 
the latter measures how insufficiently diversified are domestic investors across global market.  I 
follow Lau et al.(2010) and define FB as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic 
48 
 
equity held by foreign investors divided by the country’s total market capitalization. Similarly, HB 
is defined as the share of domestic investors’ holdings of their domestic stocks relative to the 
weight of the country’s market capitalization in the world market. The equity holdings data are 
from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of IMF. 
Higher FB, or lower HB, proxies for better global risk sharing, and thus contributes to lower cost 
of capital and higher stock market level. More importantly, as a country is more integrated into the 
world market, the local factors, including domestic income disparities, should have less impact on 
its local stock market. Therefore, in addition to FB or HB themselves, I also control for the 
interaction terms of HB (FB) with inequality. The results from these regressions are reported in 
Table 2.5. 
The left panel shows results using MSCI P/D ratio as dependent variable and the right panel using 
GFD P/D ratio as dependent variable.  In almost all regressions, the interaction term of developed 
country with Gini has significantly negative coefficient and Gini itself also has negative 
coefficient. In other words, even after accounting for the global risk-sharing factors, the negative 
relationship between domestic income inequality and stock price persists, especially in the more 
developed countries. Also worth noticing is that the interaction term of Gini with FB is 
significantly positive while the interaction term of Gini with HB is mostly negative. These results 
confirm the conjecture that as the domestic market is more isolated from the global market (i.e. in 
case of higher HB and lower FB), the domestic factors play less important role in affecting the 
domestic market price.  
 
49 
 
2.4 Robustness 
Regressions in the previous section reveal an inverse relation between income inequality as 
measured by Gini coefficients from “All-the-Ginis” database and stock market levels across 
countries. The negative correlation is more prominent in economically more developed countries. 
It persists after controlling for conventional risk factors, a comprehensive set of country-specific 
political and institutional characteristics and year fixed effects, as well as indicators of degree of 
global risk sharing. In this section, I perform more tests to evaluate the robustness of the findings 
above. First, I examine whether the previous findings are sensitive to different sources of income 
data or alternative inequality measures. Next I consider alternative model specifications and extra 
factors on stock market. 
2.4.1 Alternative Inequality Measures: WIID2 Data 
One of the most widely used income dataset by economist is WIID2 database assembled by World 
Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER). In this sub-section, I conduct robustness 
test with two inequality measures from income data in WIID2.  
In Table 2.6, I replicate the regressions in section 3 with these WIID2 income inequality measures 
and MSCI P/D ratios. The left panel reports results using income Gini coefficients from WIID2 
database (WIID2 Gini), and the right panel the ratio of income held by the top decile and the other 
nine deciles (WIID2 IR). 
A quick look at Table 2.6A shows that both the magnitude of the coefficients of inequality terms 
and the degree of statistical significance remain close to their earlier counterparts in Table 2.3 and 
Table 2.5A. If anything, we see even stronger evidence of negative relationship between market 
price and inequality from using this new set of income inequality data than from using the All-the-
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Ginis inequality. For instance, in the full model with all country characteristic controls and global 
risk-sharing controls (foreign investability), the coefficient on Gini in Table 2.5A (Model 4) is 
about -0.030(t = -3.87) and coefficient on the interaction term of Gini with dummy “Developed” is 
-0.014 (t= -3.14); while in Table 2.6A (Model 8), the coefficient on WIID2 Gini is about -0.038 (t = 
-4.78) and that on the interaction term is about -0.024 (t= -4.55). In Table 2.6B, the estimated 
coefficient on WIID2 IR (income ratio) itself is -0.02 (t= -4.58) in Model 8 of Table 2.6B, and the 
coefficient on the interaction between WIID2 IR with Developed is -0.018 (t= -2.97). These results 
are also quite comparable to the results achieved with Ginis in the counterpart regressions.  
In conclusion, this section offers solid evidence of a strong negative relation between international 
stock market levels and degrees of income disparities.  
2.4.2 Total GDP and Population 
Demand and market size play an important role in the determination of asset prices. Merton(1987) 
proposes that an increase in investor bases increases a firm’s value. Several papers (see, for 
example, Shleifer(1986), Kaul et al(2000), and Chen et al(2004)) show a downward sloping 
demand curve for stocks. Amihud et al(1999) present evidence using Japanese data that an increase 
in firm’s base of individual investors is associated with significant increase in the stock prices. 
Given that global market is still segmented, the size of a country is likely to be relevant for the 
asset pricing. On the other hand, Campante & Do(2007) find a negative relationship between 
population size and income inequality. Therefore in this section, to isolate the inequality effects 
from country size effects, I include total population and total GDP of a country in lieu of the GDP 
per capita in regressions.  
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Table 2.7 replicates the Model 2, 4 in Table 2.5A, 2.5B and Model 7,8 in Table 2.6A, 2.6B, i.e. the 
regressions with full set of controls including HB or FB terms indicating degrees of global market 
segmentation. The first four columns present regressions with Giniall inequality measure and two 
different P/D ratio measures; column 5-6 present results with WIID2 Gini and column 7-8 with 
WIID2 IR and (logged) MSCI P/D as dependent variable. A quick look shows that the patterns of 
cross-country stock market levels remain substantially the same as observed in previous sections. 
In most of the regressions, even after controlling for proxies of degree of global market integration, 
domestic income inequality still has statistically significant negative correlation with market P/D 
ratio.  In developed countries, this inverse relationship is even more notable than in developing 
countries. Estimates show that population is not an economically or statistically significant factor 
for stock market price except for in one model (column 2), where the coefficient has a t-stat of 
2.08. GDP is shown to be positive and significant in most regressions, although the scale is very 
small. In all, Table 2.7 consolidates that countries with higher inequality tend to have lower stock 
market. 
Overall, this section further corroborates our evidence that difference in domestic income 
disparities across the wide range of countries has important asset pricing implications. Speciﬁcally, 
international differences in the degree of income inequality are strongly and negatively associated 
with the cross-sectional variation of the market price and dividend ratio. The conclusion is robust 
to both measures of inequality and different specifications of regressions. 
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2.5 Decomposing the PD Ratio 
In section 3 and 4, I find significant evidence of a negative relationship between degree of 
domestic income inequality and stock market levels. The relationship is more pronounced in 
developed countries than in developing countries. I have put these findings to extensive empirical 
scrutiny in a cross-country context, and the data robustly confirm them.  
While the negative coefficients on income inequality should be interpreted with caution, it is more 
reasonable to view it as reflecting the influence of inequality on stock prices than the other way 
around. Even if domestic stock market level does play a role in transitorily altering the income 
distribution, we should observe larger gap between the rich and the poor during a booming market 
since the rich usually hold more stocks and benefit more from higher market level. In other words, 
if there is reverse causality, we should observe positive correlation between inequality and market 
P/D ratio instead of a negative one. Hence it is reasonable to interpret the income inequality as a 
state variable in determining stock prices. 
Now that I’ve established the negative effect of income inequality on price, a question follows 
naturally: How does inequality affect stock market level?  
In asset pricing theory, price (total expected returns) can be decomposed into expected excess 
returns (risk premium) and risk-free rate. Income distributions may impact stock prices through 
either or both of these two channels. In this section, I test whether one channel is dominating the 
other, and empirically evaluate their importance in explaining the observed cross-country 
correlation between inequality and price dividend ratio.  
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2.5.1 Expected Excess Returns 
The first channel to consider is the expected excess returns channel. A large body of asset pricing 
literature has been devoted to solving equity premium puzzle with heterogeneous agents. Among 
them, most models share the common ingredients of an incomplete market setting, with 
uninsurable income risk, stock market entrance cost and/or borrowing constraints. The rationale is 
that the entrance cost (and borrowing constraint) leads to limited stock market participation and 
limited risk sharing, eventually resulting in higher equity premium. Giannetti and Koskinen(2010) 
document a significant link between income Gini and stock market participation rate in several of 
their regressions using cross-country data. Favilukis(2013) combines income inequality, 
participation cost, and borrowing constraints in a model to jointly explain observed trends in 
wealth inequality, stock market participation, decreasing interest rate and equity premium puzzle. 
All these works help to propose a possible explanation of how income inequality affects risk 
premium and stock price. An important determinant of the decision on whether to participate in 
stock market is the magnitude of the costs relative to the investor’s income. When these costs are 
fixed across investors, income distribution thus plays a role on the degree of their participation in 
domestic market. Therefore, income inequality can be viewed as a proxy for the participation rate 
of domestic stock market and a proxy for degree of domestic risk sharing. 
This theory not only is consistent with evidence of the inverse relationship between inequality and 
market level across countries, it also potentially explains why this relationship is stronger in 
developed countries. In developed countries, higher inequality is more likely to lead to lower 
degree of participation and limited risk sharing than in under-developed countries: Indeed, in a 
developing country with very low average income, a lower Gini (more “equal”) probably means a 
larger fraction of poverty among population and therefore fewer people can afford to buy stocks. 
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While in economies with higher average incomes, lower Ginis usually represent a larger fraction of 
people belong to middle- or high-income class that are able to pay to enter stock market. In such 
countries, higher inequality indicates less stock market participation and limited risk sharing 
among domestic investors. Consequently, the consumption volatility is higher and the risk 
premium is higher than when income is more equally.  
To see if this is the mechanism income distribution impacts returns and stock prices, I employ 
realized excess market returns from MSCI international equity indices as proxy for risk premia and 
run them against lagged inequality measures as well as a set of control variables in similar 
regressions as conducted in Section 2.3 and 2.4. If the above story is true, we should see positive 
coefficients on inequality. The results are presented in Table 2.8. 
  ,   =   +   ∗            , +   ∗          , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
Model 1 of Table 2.8 shows the simple regression of realized excess returns on lagged income 
Gini. The estimated coefficient is -0.15, with a t-stat of merely -0.81. This is contradicting the 
expected positive sign of inequality in the limited participation theory. When adding in more 
control variables, I obtain mixed signs on the estimates of Gini and interaction terms of Gini with 
dummy “Developed”, all of them statistically insignificant. For instance, in the full regression with 
home bias (Model 5), the estimate on Gini itself is 0.13 (t=0.20), while in most other models, the 
estimated coefficients on Gini are slightly negative. In the regression with foreign investability 
(Model 6) where the estimate is about 0 (t=0.01). In more developed countries, estimates on the 
interaction terms in Model 5 and 6 are -0.25 (t= -0.77) and -0.34 (t= -1.07) respectively, slightly 
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more significant than in developing countries. Even so, they are still far from 10% significance 
level and have negative rather than positive signs.  
It seems from Table 2.8 that the effect of income inequality on “future” excess returns is really 
ambiguous and inconclusive at the best. This is contradicting the mechanism discussed above that 
higher inequality potentially raises equity premium by limiting the rate of stock market 
participation. However, these results may also be partly due to the fact that realized returns are 
noisy measures of expected excess returns, as well as the lacking data. Unlike excess returns data, 
interest rates are more directly and more reliably recorded and thus may provide better tests to 
draw for conclusions. 
2.5.2 Real Interest Rate  
A second channel for income distribution to affect prices is through risk-free rate.  On the one 
hand, as discussed in the previous section, higher inequality may mean that a larger fraction of 
population is restricted from participating in stock market and buffering their idiosyncratic risks. 
This is more likely to happen in “richer” countries. Consequently, the demand for precautionary 
saving grows and therefore lowers the interest rates. On the other hand, higher inequality may also 
imply that a smaller fraction of the population, especially in poorer countries, can even afford to 
save. This means that inequality can also have a negative effect on the demand for saving and 
positive effect on the interest rates.  
I examine both possibilities with regressions and report results in Table 2.9. The dependent 
variable in these regressions is the T-bill rates from IMF adjusted for inflation; For the country-
years where T-bill rates are not available, I create the “pseudo” T-bill rates by subtracting the 
cross-country average of spread between prime (lending) rates and T-bill rates from the prime 
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rates.17 The spread data are obtained from WDI database of World Bank.  Table 2.9 reports the 
regressions of real interest rates on Gini coefficients and other control variables. 
The single regression (Model 1) shows an estimated coefficient of about 0.22 (t= 2.52) on Gini. 
More regressions in Model 2 to Model 6 confirm the positive relationship between real interest rate 
and the Ginis.   
Beside income inequality, difference in the fractions of saving population across countries may 
contribute to the difference in interest rates. To examine this effect, I control for net saving rate in 
model 7 and Model 8 of Table 2.9 in addition to the regressors in Model 5 and 6. Net saving rates 
are net national savings as percent of Gross National Income (GNI). Here the net national savings 
are GNI less total consumption (including consumption of fixed capital) and then plus net 
transfers. Savings data are from WDI database of World Bank. In both Model 7 and 8, real interest 
rates are significantly negatively related to net saving rate as expected. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient on Gini in Model 7 with HB (home bias) is still positive (0.19) at about 10% 
significance level (t=1.70). In Model 8 where global segmentation is proxied by FB (foreign 
investability), the estimate of coefficient on Gini is even more significant at 1% level (t = 3.22).  
A natural question to ask is whether this positive interest rate effect is big enough to explain the 
inequality effect on P/D. To answer it, I divide the sample into 10 deciles according to the value of 
Giniall. Moving from decile 1 to decile 10, the average Giniall varies by 29.25 points, from 26.79 
to 56.04. Recall that the estimated coefficient on Giniall in the benchmark P/D regression model 
(Model 6 of Table 2.3) is about -0.02. The P/D therefore drops by 58.5% from its initial value of 
41.01 moving from decile 1 to 10. The Gini coefficient in the corresponding interest rate regression 
                                                          
17 In unreported regressions, I also use prime (lending) rates (from WDI) instead of T-bill rates as dependent variable, or repeat the 
regressions on the subsample of country-years where the T-bill rates are available. The results remain substantially unchanged. 
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(Model 4, Table 2.9) implies a 526.5 basis point increase in real interest rate for the same move. 
Now let’s assume in accordance with the Lucas model that P/D is roughly equal to 1/(  + EP - µ), 
where    is the risk-free rate, EP is the risk premium and µ is the expected dividend growth rate. 
Given that the average real interest rate in decile 1 is 2.25% , moving from decile 1 to decile 10 
yields a new interest rate of 7.52%. If we further assume that risk premium and dividend growth 
are of similar size so roughly cancels each other out, the new P/D resulted from change in real 
interest rate alone is then about 13.3, a nearly 68% cut from the original value (41.01). This means 
that the inequality effect on real interest rate is more than enough to explain inequality effect on the 
market level. 
Results in Table 2.9 are both interesting and puzzling. They help verify that inequality influence 
prices through interest rates channel and not the excess returns channel. However, none of the 
existing asset pricing models or theories seems able to explain this positive effect. They raise a new 
question about the mechanism of interaction between inequality and interest rates. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper is motivated by both the recent policy-related debates on income inequality and by the 
large body of asset pricing models with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. I try to 
examine and quantify the effect of income inequality by estimating its impact on stock market 
wealth. This method provides a non-ideological way to evaluate policies that influence income 
distribution. Specifically, I argue that with the presence of global market segmentation, the cross-
country differences in domestic income distributions may play a role in determining the cross-
country variations in stock market levels (scaled by the market’s aggregate dividends). This 
58 
 
hypothesis is consistent (although indirectly) with many asset pricing models that incorporates 
heterogeneity, uninsurable income risks and limited risk-sharing. Thus testing of the hypothesis 
also provides a way of indirectly testing these models.  
Several important issues are addressed when specifying the regression model and interpreting the 
empirical results. A first one is that the entire argument of linking the international variation in 
market levels to international diversity in income inequality relies on the assumption that global 
market is not fully integrated. This is the maintained assumption throughout the study. Moreover, 
the degree of global market segmentation interplays with domestic income inequality to affect 
domestic stock market level. Hence I include two alternative proxies of global risk-sharing in some 
regressions to control for their effects. Another identification issue is the endogeneity of the main 
independent variable, income inequality. Econometrically, endogeneity may result from both 
omitted variables and measurement errors. To address the omitted variable problem, I control for a 
comprehensive set of variables that are likely related to both income inequality and stock market 
levels and include year fixed effects in all regressions. I also employ different proxies of income 
inequality from two sources with highest quality income data to minimize the measurement errors. 
All the price-inequality regressions consistently and robustly reveal significant negative correlation 
between the two, despite the various specifications and alternative measures of both dependent and 
independent variables. This correlation can be viewed to reflect the negative effect of income 
inequality on stock price. Two arguments help ruling out the reverse causality: One is the fact that 
income distribution is mainly driven by slow-moving institutional and social components. It is hard 
to conjecture a mechanism for stock market levels to affect these components or the equilibrium 
income distributions. Secondly, although stock market fluctuations may temporarily alter income 
inequality, a positive correlation should be observed to result from this mechanism while my 
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regressions show a negative correlation that’s not only statistically significant but economically 
significant as well. Keeping other things constant, a 0.01 increase in income Gini alone can lower 
the market P/D ratio by up to 2%.  
I further discover that the negative effect of income inequality on stock market level is stronger in 
developed countries than in developing countries, and it is not weakened by the inclusion of 
proxies for global risk sharing (also measuring the degree of domestic market’s segmentation from 
the global market). These findings show that income distributions do matter for stock prices. They 
not only provide supporting evidence for models with heterogeneity, but also point to the 
possibility to model income distribution directly as a state variable in pricing models. To identify 
the channel and possible mechanism of how income inequality affects prices, I decompose price 
into expected excess return and risk-free rate and investigate how each of the two components are 
related to inequality in cross-country settings. I find that income inequality has strong positive 
effects on interest rates but hardly seems to have any effect on subsequent excess returns. 
Therefore I conclude for this part that income distributions mainly affect prices through the risk-
free rate channel.  
To the best of my knowledge, my research here is  the first cross-country study on the price impact 
of income distributions. It is also the first to explore the main channel linking inequality and prices. 
From the modeling perspective, the findings in this paper are both novel and puzzling. Evidences 
of significant negative cross-sectional effect of income inequality on stock market P/D ratio 
provide strong empirical support for the asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents as well as 
grounds for theories to incorporate income distribution as state variables. On the other hand, the 
estimated strong positive correlation between interest rates and income inequality poses a 
challenge to the existing pricing models since it cannot be explained by any of these models. For 
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policy makers, my paper provides a straightforward way to quantify the effect of income inequality 
and directly evaluate the policies that have implications for income distributions. The conclusion in 
this regards is that policies that increase income inequality are expected to decrease the stock 
market wealth. 
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CHAPTER 3: INCOME HETEROGENEITY, INEQUALITY AND 
INTEREST RATES 
3.1 Introduction 
The sharp increase in income inequality globally in the past couple of decades is a well-
documented fact. Meanwhile there are still great differences in the distribution of income across 
countries. Understanding the consequences of inequality on various aspects of macroeconomics 
is a challenge to many economists.  
In Chapter 2, I try to contribute to this understanding by studying if and how cross-country 
variations in domestic income distributions is related to cross-country differences in asset 
valuations. I find a significant negative correlation between income inequality and stock market 
levels (measured by price-dividend ratios) after controlling for an extensive set of country-
specific risk factors and characteristics. I then decompose price dividend ratio into risk-free rate 
and expected excess returns and examine the link between each of these components and 
inequality. I find that increasing income disparity lowers prices mainly by raising real interest 
rates, while there is no evidence that inequality is positively related to expected excess returns.  
Why the interest rate is positively related to income inequality is puzzling and incompatible with 
most existing theories, as will be discussed later. 
Building on the work of Athanasoulis(2005), this paper tries to answer this question by taking a 
closer look at how interest rate and income inequality are each connected to the heterogeneity in 
idiosyncratic income risks. I accomplish the task by obtaining and examining closed-form 
solutions to equilibrium interest rate, portfolio holdings and inequality in a discrete-time asset 
pricing model that features untradable idiosyncratic income risks and constant absolute risk 
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aversion (CARA) preference. In this model, individual income risks have different correlations 
to the aggregate risk, and income heterogeneity is defined as the cross-sectional variance in these 
correlations. A couple of insights are gained from the model: Firstly, the equilibrium interest rate 
goes up with dispersion in income risks. The rationale is that, in the same vein as the optimal 
portfolio diversification, the more dispersed the idiosyncratic risks (in terms of their correlations 
to the aggregate risk), the easier for agents in the economy to cancel out their risks by trading 
with others. With improved risk sharing in the economy, the volatility of average consumption 
growth drops, and this in turn reduces the precautionary saving motive, resulting in higher 
interest rate in the equilibrium. Meanwhile, the model also shows that consumption inequality, 
defined as the expected dispersion in consumption growth, is an increasing function in income 
heterogeneity18. These two results provide a possible explanation for the positive correlation we 
observe between interest rate and the inequality: it may be reflecting both interest rate and 
inequality’s positive connection to income heterogeneity.  
The empirical test of the model requires some measure of income heterogeneity in data. Since 
the dispersion in the covariances of individual risks with the aggregate risk is not directly 
observable, I solve for two quantities from the model that can be used to proxy for it in empirical 
tests. One of them is the ratio of average consumption risk to the average income risk. This ratio 
measures how dampened the volatility of average consumption is relative to the volatility of 
income and thus captures the total effectiveness of risk sharing in the economy, including the 
part that is due to income heterogeneity. Under the model setting, this ratio is increasing in 
income heterogeneity. The other proxy for income heterogeneity is the saving rate of the 
                                                          
18 By construction, the income inequality in this model does not rely on dispersion in income risks. It is reasonable to consider 
consumption inequality instead of income inequality because the two are positively and closely related. Besides, consumption is 
considered by most economists a more relevant measure of well-being than income.  
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economy, defined as the cross-sectional variance in the equilibrium bond demands. I show 
numerically that for reasonable parameter values and sufficient level of income heterogeneity, 
the saving rate drops as heterogeneity gets higher. Empirical tests confirm that saving rates go 
some way in reducing the positive coefficient of real interest rate on income inequality. However, 
the ratio of consumption risk to income risk does not help.   
Since the focus of this study is how inequality influences equilibrium pricing, it is natural to look 
at related works in extant asset pricing literature where heterogeneity is incorporated. There are 
two types of heterogeneities to be considered: ex-ante heterogeneity like dispersion in agents’ 
preferences and ex-post heterogeneity like labor income risks etc. There has been some 
theoretical and empirical evidence that either one of them or a combination of the two can 
influence both the income (wealth) inequality19 and the equilibrium quantities and prices, which I 
discuss in more details later. 
It is worth mentioning first though, as shown in Constantinides(1982), the equilibrium of an 
economy with heterogeneous agents can be duplicated by the equilibrium in a Lucas 
representative economy when the assumptions of complete markets, frictionless transaction and 
CRRA utilities are maintained. In other words, income or wealth distribution does not matter 
unless one or more of the above assumptions is removed.  
Gollier(2001) is an example of maintaining the complete market assumption while removing 
CRRA preference. He shows that in an Arrow-Debreu economy with otherwise identical agents 
except for their initial endowment, wealth inequality reduces the equilibrium risk-free rate if 
agents have concave absolute risk tolerance (the inverse of Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion). 
                                                          
19 Ana Castañeda et al.(2003) shows that uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to ex-ante identical households’  endowments of efficiency 
labor account for the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly; and Cozzi(2011) finds that models calibrated with 
heterogeneous preference replicates several features of US wealth distribution well, including the bottom and top quntiles.  
64 
 
Instead of relying solely on nonstandard preference, a growing literature takes a different route to 
examine how heterogeneity influences asset prices by relaxing the complete or frictionless 
market assumption. For example, Huggett(1993) argues that uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks 
imply a precautionary motive for saving that increases aggregate wealth and reduces the 
equilibrium interest rate. In his model, there is no state-contingent security to insure idiosyncratic 
endowment risk, and only a risk-free asset. In more recent models with heterogeneity and 
incomplete market, households can usually trade assets other than risk-free bond to hedge their 
risks. However the implication of heterogeneity on equilibrium level of interest rate remains: the 
lack of full complete insurance market and limited risk sharing lead to higher average 
consumption risk of all or part of the agents in the economy, which raises their precautionary 
saving motive and suppresses the equilibrium interest rate. Athanasoulis(2005) solves a model 
with uninsurable labor income risks and CARA utility function and analytically shows that 
interest rate is lowered by the incorporation of untradable idiosyncratic risks. Chien and 
Lustig(2010) introduces limited liability into their model to create endogenous solvency 
constraints and delivers substantial variation in equity risk-premiums and a low risk-free rate. 
Other examples include a large body of asset pricing models with limited stock market 
participation (Basak and Cuoco(1998) and Polkovnichenko(2004)20, etc.). The mechanism is that 
the aggregate risk is concentrated in the hands of stock holders and equilibrium interest rate 
directly responds to the precautionary saving motive of this part of the population, which is 
higher than in an unrestricted economy. The assumption of borrowing constraints is also 
effective in delivering a low risk-free rate in a model with idiosyncratic income risks. It works 
                                                          
20 Polkovnichenko(2004) reaches the lower interest rate result with the additional assumption that stockholders are more risk averse 
than nonstockholder. 
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either on its own (Telmer(1993) and Heaton and Lucas(1996)) or coupled with limited 
participation (Guo(2004) and Favilukis(2013)). 
In addition to the literature with ex-post heterogeneity mentioned above, several papers also 
reach the conclusion that ex-ante heterogeneity may result in lower interest rate. Guvenen(2009) 
studies asset prices in a two-agent macroeconomic model with limited stock market participation, 
heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS) and Epstein-Zin 
preference. His model delivers a much lower risk-free rate compared to that in a standard 
representative economy21 . Cozzi(2011) examines whether heterogeneity in people’s attitude 
toward risk helps accounting for US wealth inequality. He develops an incomplete model with 
uninsurable labor income risk and heterogeneity in agents risk aversion. The calibrated22 model 
was able to match several features of the observed wealth distribution, including the bottom and 
top quintiles. The model also shows that the inclusion of preference heterogeneity gives rise to 
higher precautionary saving and lower interest rate. 
To conclude, all these models imply that higher income inequality, which is usually the outcome 
of the heterogeneities discussed above, should result in lower interest rate23.  
The model in my paper is based on Athanasoulis(2005). However, instead of focusing on the 
effect of the magnitude of the idiosyncratic income risks on pricing as in his paper and in most of 
the papers mentioned above, I look at the cross-sectional variations in idiosyncratic income risks. 
Specifically, I examine if the variations in the correlations of individual risks with the aggregate 
                                                          
21 The author argues that “the low risk-free rate is helped by the fact that the model abstracts from long-run growth and preferences 
are of the Epstein–Zin form.” 
22  The model is calibrated with preference distributions from Kimball et al.(2009), Harrison et al.(2007) and Chiappori and 
Paiella(2011) and the three setting result in remarkably similar wealth distribution.  
23 In addition to the asset pricing theories discussed here, Rajan(2011) provides a different theory for the income inequality to affect 
interest rate. He argues that politicians respond to rising inequality by giving out easy credits to prop up the living standards of the 
population with lower income and this eventually leads to financial crisis. If this is the case then we should see a positive correlation 
between interest rate and inequality. Again this is just the opposite of what I find in Chapter 2. 
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risk affect the scope of risk sharing and the equilibrium prices. As far as I know, this paper is the 
first to study the asset pricing implication of heterogeneity from this angle. The emphasis on how 
aggregate and idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations covary is important for a couple of reasons. Firstly there 
has been empirical evidence that there is extensive heterogeneity in the correlation between 
individual income and stock returns (See, for example, Heaton and Lucas(2000), Campbell et 
al.(2001) and Davis and Willen(2000)). Secondly it allows us to gain better understanding of the 
extent to which heterogeneity, when coupled with market incompleteness, ampliﬁes the eﬀect of 
aggregate shocks. Although this paper only zooms in on the influence of heterogeneity in the 
covariance between individual and aggregate risks on interest rate, the model can obviously be 
used to examine  the role of the heterogeneity on, for example, determining portfolio holdings 
and in other issues of asset pricing. 
Overall, this paper presents some supporting evidence for the model-implied hypothesis that 
cross-country variations in income heterogeneity is the driving force behind the observed 
positive real interest rate-inequality relation. However, the evidence is still mixed. While one 
proxy (saving rate) of income heterogeneity explains away part of the positive coefficient of 
interest rate with respect to inequality, the other proxy (ratio of the average consumption risk to 
income risk) does not reduce the coefficient on inequality. This may be partially attributed to the 
deficiency in the construction of the proxies though. Both measures are created with aggregate 
income (GDP or GNI) and consumption data from each country, which can be insufficient to 
capture the cross-sectional variations within the country 24 . Further tests with income 
                                                          
24 That said, when compared across countries, the differences in these aggregate quantities should be able to reflect differences in the 
within-country heterogeneity at least to some degree, especially when other country-level characters are controlled for. 
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heterogeneity proxies constructed from micro-level income and consumption data25 can be done 
to see if this is the case. Taken at face value, the model’s interpretation of the evidence could 
have implications for predicting the effects of redistributive policies that affect income inequality. 
The model also implicitly implies the importance of risk sharing channels other than financial 
market in determining the equilibrium price and quantities. For example, both public and private 
insurance directly and indirectly26 improve the scope and level of risk sharing for a given income 
distribution and therefore may affect the saving pattern of the economy and the valuations.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes an incomplete asset pricing 
model with income heterogeneity and formulates how interest rates, inequality and two other 
endogenous quantities are each affected by the heterogeneity. Section 3 empirically tests the 
hypothesis derived from the model and discusses the role of income heterogeneity in the positive 
interest rate-inequality correlation. Section 4 concludes. 
3.2 Model 
The model in this section is based on the framework developed by Athanasoulis(2005), who tries 
to study how primitives such as endowments, preference and exogenous properties (e.g. stock 
market participation rate) affect the equity premium and Sharpe ratio etc. When evaluating the 
effect of income risks on asset prices, Athanasoulis only looks at the magnitudes of the 
idiosyncratic income risks and does not analyze other heterogeneity in income risks, while my 
study concentrates on the dispersion of income risks in terms of how they covary with the 
aggregate dividend risk. 
                                                          
25 For example, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) have household-level 
income and consumption data for a list of countries. 
26 Gormley et al.(2010) shows that access to insurance market helps hedging large negative wealth shock and increases investors’ 
willingness to participate in stock market. 
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The model is set up as follows. 
The economy is populated with N individuals who are infinitely lived. They each maximize the 
life-time utility function  
−   ∑  (   )                                                                                    (1) 
where   is the risk aversion parameter and   is the discount rate.  
The consumption C comes from two sources: Each agent is endowed with an asset that pays an 
infinitely-divisible and tradable dividend D each period. The per capita dividend stream D 
follows a random walk with a drift: 
∆  =  +                                                                                          (2) 
where   is i.i.d. normal with zero mean and variance   . 
In addition, each individual also receives a non-tradable labor income that pays a random walk 
stream    : 
∆  , =   +   ,                                                                     (3) 
where    is i.i.d. normal with zero mean and variance    .  Assume   and    for  = 1,… ,   are 
jointly normally distributed with correlation    and the innovations are uncorrelated across time.   
At each time t, the agents can trade their share of D as well as a one-period bond that has zero net 
supply, unit price and earn (endogenous) interest rate   ;  Define   ( ) and   ( ) as the shares of 
the risky asset and bond held by individual   at time t, and    as the price of the risky asset. Then  ’s budget constraint at each time t is: 
  ( )  +   ( ) +   , =   ( − 1)(  +   ) +   , +   ( − 1)(1 +     ), ∀  ≥ 1           (4) 
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Under the assumption of CARA utility, the portfolio holding, prices, interest rate in the 
equilibrium and many other variables can be solved in closed form. 
It is worth noting that there are two types of income heterogeneity in this model: the ex-ante 
agent heterogeneity that is due to the dispersion in   ,  i.e. the dispersion in idiosyncratic income 
risks in terms of their correlations to the aggregate risk, and the ex-post heterogeneity that is 
realized through the specific income shocks    . In this paper, the focus is on the former, the 
cross-sectional variances in   , . 
In the following subsections, I show analytically how interest rate, inequality and income 
heterogeneity are related to each other. 
3.2.1. Real Interest Rate  
From here on, for tractability I assume   → ∞ and   ≡  ,   ≡    for all  . In addition, I 
assume    is symmetrically distributed so that  [   ] = 0 , and         =  (   (  ))   for 
some constant  ≥ 0. 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium real interest rate    is constant over time, i.e.   =   and is an 
increasing function of income heterogeneity    (  ): 
 = (1 +  )             − 1                                                       (5) 
Where       is the average consumption risk: 
    =    −      (  ) =    (1–   (  ))                                   (6) 
and    =                                                                                           (7) 
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Proof: Assume at time  , agent  ’s stock holding is   ( ) =   , then from Athanasoulis(2005),   =   and 
ln(1 +  ) = ln(1 +  ) +     ∑        +   ∑        −      ∑   ,                        (*) 
Define   =        =            and individual  ’s stock holding at time   is: 
  = 1 + ∑           −      = 1 +  ̅ −    ⟹  1        = 1/  
And variance in  ’s innovation in consumption, i.e. agent  ’s consumption risk: 
  ,  =      +    + 2       =   ( ̅ −    ) +     
So the average consumption risk is decreasing in    (  ) since: 
    = 1    ,      =   1    ̅ −         + 1          
= −     (  ) +    =    (1 −    (  )) 
Substitute into equation (*) and rearrange, we have 
 = (1 +  )             − 1 
Since the discount rate   is positive: 
   (   (  )) = 12      (1 +  )             > 0 
Therefore the equilibrium interest rate r is increasing in the income heterogeneity    (  ).    ∎ 
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Here   =          is the dividend beta: higher    means an individual will trade more D to hedge 
his labor income risk.    depends on both the magnitude of labor income risk and how individual 
labor income risk covaries with aggregate (dividend) risk. Income heterogeneity    (  ) 
measures how dispersed individual income risks are in terms of their correlation to the aggregate 
risk.     (  ) =         (  ) therefore tells us the risk sharing capacity due to this income 
heterogeneity through trading of the market portfolio. 
In short, Proposition 1 states that income heterogeneity (   (  ) , or    (  )) increases real 
interest rate by reducing the average consumption risk. The intuition is that given the existing 
risk sharing channels, the more diversified the population in terms of their income risk profiles, 
the higher the chance of the individual risks canceling each other out. In this sense, an economy 
with high income heterogeneity is similar to a diversified investment portfolio in that risks are 
minimized due to the diversification. Therefore income heterogeneity contributes to risk sharing 
and consumption smoothing. People have less precautionary saving motives and thus the interest 
rate increases. 
3.2.2. Inequality  
In the previous section, I show that interest rate is positively related to the income heterogeneity. 
In this section I investigate how income heterogeneity is related to inequality.  
Usually income inequality refers to disparity in income levels. However, by model assumptions, 
income level is nonstationary and therefore the inequality is undefinable for the levels.  For this 
reason, the income inequality in this model is defined as expected value of the dispersion in 
income growth (increment). Similarly the consumption inequality is also defined as the 
dispersion in consumption growth. 
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According to this definition, income inequality in the model is exogenous and is not related to    (  ).  Since we assume that  → ∞ and   =   for all  , by Law of Large Numbers, income 
inequality is  
 [     (∆  )] =          +   ,   =          ,   =                                                 (8) 
Therefore the income inequality here is not affected by the heterogeneity in covariances between 
individual and aggregate risks.  
However, consumption inequality in the model is endogenous. Although the findings that this 
paper aims to explain are based on income inequality data, it is justified to consider consumption 
inequality here for two reasons. 
Firstly, consumption is usually deemed a more comprehensive measure of well-being of the 
consumers and consumption inequality is what really matters. Income inequality is more broadly 
adopted in empirical studies mainly because income is easier to report than consumption and 
income data are considered more accurate than consumption data.  
On the other hand, what we observe between income inequality and interest rate may indeed be 
reflecting the relationship between consumption inequality and interest rate. The two inequality 
measures are closely related and many literatures (Krueger and Perri(2006), Aguiar and 
Bils(2011) and Meyer(2013) etc.) have confirmed that the two inequality measures usually have 
the same trend of growth.  
Proposition 2:  Consumption inequality is monotonically increasing in income 
heterogeneity    (  )and    (  ) 
       ∆  ,   =    +      (  ) +    4       (  )   
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=    +       (  ) +        (   (  ))                                        (9) 
where   is a non-negative constant.  
Proof:  Assume at any time  , the stock holding   ( ) =    and the bond holding   ( ) =   , +  ,   . 
The consumption inequality is defined as:  
       ∆  ,   =          ∆  + ∆  , +    ,    
=          ( +   ) + ( +   , ) +    ,    
Since the stock holding is: 
  = 1 + ∑           −      =  ̅ −    
It will be shown in Proposition 3 that 
   , = −[   −  2    ,  −       ] 
where                                                 =         and  ̅ =   ∑       ,   → ∞ 
  ,  =      +    + 2       =   ( ̅ −    ) +      
    =   ∑   ,      =    −      (  ) =    (1–   (  )) 
Therefore              ∆  ,   =        ̅ −      +   , +      ,  −         
=      −    +   , −  2       
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=       (  ) +        ,  +   4           + 2        ,   ,  +            ,    −          ,  ,     
Using the fact that  
      ,   ,  =        ,  ,    = 0 
We have 
       ∆  ,   =         (  ) +        ,  +   4           +            ,      
=      (  ) +     +   4            
Since    is assumed to be symmetrically distributed,   [   ] = 0 ; and since         = (   (  ))   for some constant  ≥ 0: 
       ∆  ,   =    +      (  ) +    4   (   (  )) 
=    +       (  ) +    4    (   (  ))  
Hence 
        ∆  ,    (   (  )) =    +    2       (  ) > 0 
   ∎ 
The proposition above states that the consumption inequality grows as the idiosyncratic income 
risks become more diversely distributed. We have also seen in Section 2.1 that equilibrium 
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interest rate is higher when    (  ) is higher. Hence income heterogeneity    (  ) may be the 
nexus that positively links the consumption inequality to interest rate. Meanwhile, empirical 
studies have shown that changes in income inequality are of the same directions as those in 
consumption inequality. So the empirical finding that real interest rate is positively related to 
income inequality across countries may also be driven by both of their connections to income 
heterogeneity. 
3.2.3. Risk Sharing Measures vs. Income Heterogeneity 
The previous two sub-sections have established that both the real interest rate and the 
(consumption) inequality increase in income heterogeneity      (  ) . I conjecture that the 
diversity in the labor income risks not only contributes to growing inequality among agents, but 
also raises the chance for better risk sharing among agents and in turn lifts interest rate of the 
economy.   
The difficulty to test this hypothesis empirically, however, lies in that income heterogeneity    (  ) is not observable. To solve this problem, I come up with two risk sharing measures that 
can be used to proxy for income heterogeneity in the empirical tests: The ratio of average income 
risk to consumption risk, and gross saving rate. 
3.2.3.1. Ratio of Average Income Risk to Consumption Risk 
If the dispersion in idiosyncratic income risks really promotes risk sharing and we are able to 
find an empirical measure of this risk sharing effect in data, then it can be used as a proxy for 
income heterogeneity in the empirical test. One such indicator is ratio of the average labor 
income risk to the average consumption risk. 
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This can be seen with some simple calculation: 
         = 1 −    (  ) = 1 −         (  )                                                 (10) 
Since the inverse of the above ratio measures how smooth the average consumption is relative to 
the income, it embodies the total risk sharing effect, through stock market, bonds, and all other 
available channels, that is due to the income heterogeneity    (  ). 
Equation (10) is consistent with the intuition that income heterogeneity     (  ) has positive 
effect on risk sharing. It also predicts that we should expect a negative (positive) coefficient on 
the (inverse of the) ratio in Equation (10) if we add it to the regression of interest rate on 
inequality. If the addition of this factor to the regression equation reduces the positive coefficient 
on inequality then it provides the evidence that income heterogeneity reduces interest rate by 
facilitating risk sharing and that the observed interest rate-inequality relationship reflects this 
effect. 
3.2.3.2. Gross Saving Rate 
In the previous subsection I solve for the ratio that represents the total risk sharing effect of 
income heterogeneity. Another endogenous quantity that exhibits the specific risk sharing effect 
of income heterogeneity via the bond market is the saving rate, since the latter captures the 
heterogeneity in individual borrowing.  
Proposition 3: At each time t, individual i’s demand for bond is   , +   , ∗   and   ,  satisfies 
  , =       −  ̅  +    ,  −                                                                  (11) 
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Where   =          is agent  ’s dividend beta and  ̅ is the average value of   ’s across agents;    ,  =   ( ̅ −    ) +      is agent  ’s consumption risk and       is the average consumption risk. 
Proof: The Euler equation for the bond price is  
11 +  =   [ 1(1 +  )    ∆  , ] 
Substitute in ∆  , =   ∆  + ∆  , +    , =   ( +   ) + ( +   , ) +    , ,  and use the fact 
that all the terms in the exponents with   subscripts should add up to a constant (call it Ψ).  
After simplification and rearrangement: 
Ψ =     ,   −  (   +   +    , )                                              (**) 
Since the net supply of bond is zero, i.e. ∑   ,     = 0, summing (**) over   and then take the 
average, we have 
Ψ =         −  (  +  ) =         −   , as  = 1/  and  → ∞ 
Substitute back into equation (**) and rearrange: 
  , = 1  −   +    ,  −        2 = 1     −  ̅  +    ,  −        2  ∎ 
The first term of Equation (11),  −   =    −  ̅  , tells us that individuals whose idiosyncratic 
risks are less related to the aggregate risks (i.e. smaller   and   ) will buy more stocks to share 
their income risks and finance their purchase by borrowing. The second term    ,  −          shows 
that people with a consumption path that’s riskier than average will borrow. 
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Now that we know each individual’s demand for bonds (savings) at each time, we can go ahead 
and define gross saving rate of the economy.   
For analytical tractability, I define the gross saving rate as Var(  ) . Var(  ) is monotonically 
related to average absolute value of individual borrowings.  
Proposition 4: The gross saving rate    (  )  can be solved explicitly and be expressed as 
follows: 
      ,  =               (  ) +            (  )                                (12) 
Where the equilibrium interest rate and the average consumption risk are 
 = (1 +  )             − 1                                                        (5) 
 And                                                =    −      (  ) =    (1–   (  ))                                          
(6) 
Proof: From Proposition 3, 
  , = 1  −   +    ,  −        2 = 1     −  ̅  +    ,  −        2  
Where                                      =          and   ,  =   ( ̅ −    ) +       
So                                    ,  =          (  ) +          ,   +         ,   ,     
= 1        (  ) +   4      (   ) −        (  ,   )  
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Given the assumption that   [   ] = 0 (hence  [  ] =  ̅ = 0), and          =  (   (  ))  
for some constant ≥ 0 : 
   (  ,   ) =  [   ] −  [   ] [  ] = 0  
So 
      ,  = 1        (  ) +    4       (  )    
=               (  ) +            (  )                                         (12) 
And by Proposition 1   
 = (1 +  )             − 1                                                        (5) 
 and                                                 =    −      (  ) =    (1–   (  ))                                      
(6) 
 ∎ 
Intuitively, heterogeneity has two effects on saving rate: Higher income heterogeneity drives up 
saving rate since the dispersion in individual saving is affected by the dispersion in individual’s 
demand for stocks, which is governed by the diversity of income risks (see Equation (11)). 
Meanwhile, since heterogeneity in idiosyncratic income risks helps improving risk sharing via 
diversification, the average consumption risk of the economy drops and thus lowers the 
precautionary saving motive and in turn the saving rates. Mechanically, since both the 
denominator and the numerator of the saving rate       ,   are increasing functions of    (  ), 
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it is hard to tell analytically if the former is increasing or decreasing in the latter. In the next 
section, I parameterize the model and obtain some numerical results.  
3.2.4. Numerical Analysis 
While the closed-form solutions from the model provides some easy analytical results and useful 
intuition on how income heterogeneity may affect inequality and real interest rate, it is not so 
straightforward to tell from the solutions how saving rate       ,  , income heterogeneity    (  ), (consumption) inequality and the equilibrium interest rate   are interrelated. To better 
identify these links, I conduct some numerical exercises in this section. 
3.2.4.1. Parameters  
Equations (5), (6), (9) and (12) give expressions of real interest rate, average consumption risk of 
the economy, consumption inequality and saving rates. To numerically calculate these values as 
functions of income heterogeneity    (  ), I set the following parameter values. 
The discount rate   is set to be 0.04. For the value of the absolute risk aversion coefficient   , I 
follow Caballero(1991) and Athanasoulis(2005) on their parameterization of CARA utility 
function and set the absolute risk aversion   equal to the relative risk aversion coefficient 
divided by consumption. Let relative risk aversion be 3. So   = 3  ⁄ = 3/( +  ), where   and   are per capita annual labor income and dividend, respectively.  
The parameters of the labor income and dividend process are mainly following Lucas(1994). To 
ensure that the expected ratio of dividend to labor income is constant, both the per capita labor 
income growth rate and the per capita dividend growth rate are set to 1.8%, i.e.   ⁄ =   ⁄ =0.018. The value of   ⁄  is set to 0.037, also from Lucas(1994). For the individual labor income 
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risk   , MaCurdy(1982) use wages data from Panel Study of Income and Dynamics (PSID) data 
and find the standard deviation of proportional changes in the annuity value of human wealth to 
be roughly between 0.123 and 0.247. Based on MaCurdy(1982) and Hau and Mishkin(1982), 
Caballero(1991) postulates that labor income uncertainty is on the order of 10% and possibly 
larger. He sets the lower bound and upper bound of the labor income risk to be 0.05 and 0.15 in 
his study. Meghir and Pistaferri(2004)’s estimate of unconditional variance of the (permanent) 
income shocks is 0.0313, implying a standard deviation of about 0.177. Guvenen and 
Smith(2010) tries to quantify the income risk by estimating a structural consumption-saving 
model using data from PSID and CES. They conclude that the standard deviation of the 
persistent part of the labor income shock varies from 0.196 to 0.208 and the estimates are robust 
to a set of sensitivity analyses. Based on these results, I assign five values for    ⁄ : 0.05, 0.1, 
0.15, 0.2 and 0.2527.  
Constantinides et al.(2002) find that the ratio of dividend income to total income is 0.3 and 
Athanasoulis(2005) finds this ratio to be 0.32 over his sample. So I set  ( +  ) = 0.32⁄  and 
hence the labor income is about 0.68 of the total personal income. Using US data(1970-2010) 
from World Bank, the average annual per capita GNI (in $ amount) is about 25,00028, which I 
use as ( +  ).  
Finally for constant   that makes    (   ) =      (  )  , I set its value to 229. 
                                                          
27 It is worth noting that although I follow Caballero(1991) and set the lower bound to 0.05, the larger values are probably more 
realistic estimates of the labor income uncertainty. 
28 In unreported results, I test with other (Y+D) values including normalizing it to 1. The exact value of per capita total income(Y+D) 
does not really matter for my conclusions on the relationship between interest rate, saving rate, inequality and income heterogeneity. 
29 I set a value to 2 so that θ  is normally distributed. In unreported results I experiment with other values of a between 0 and 100 
and it does not affect the conclusion. 
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3.2.4.2. Results 
Based on the parameter values above, I use Equations (5), (6), (9) and (12) to get the real interest 
rate, average consumption risk of the economy, consumption inequality and saving rates for 
varying    (  ), which is between 0 and 1 since    is the correlation between  ’s individual 
income risk and the aggregate risk. 
The results for when relative risk aversion is 3 are presented in Figure 3.1. 
Panel A of Figure 3.1 plots how the saving rate        ,   responds to changes in income 
heterogeneity. For smaller size of the labor income risk     ⁄ ,  saving rates go up as    (  ) 
becomes higher; for larger (and probably more realistic) value of     ⁄ ,  saving rates first 
increase then decrease in    (  ) . This shows the combined effects of heterogeneity on savings 
described in the previous subsection:  Higher dispersion in income risks facilitate risk sharing 
through asset trading, which is funded by more borrowing. Therefore saving rate goes up. 
However the improved risk sharing lowers the average consumption risk and hence reduces 
precautionary saving motive, resulting in lower saving rate. This graph also shows that if     (  )  is sufficiently high, then saving rates increases as the magnitude of labor income 
risks    ⁄ , or   , gets larger.  
To make sure that the model produces reasonable results, I plot model generated saving rate 
against model generated interest rate in Panel B of Figure 3.1. It shows that for reasonable values 
of labor income uncertainty    ⁄  and positive interest rate,   drops as saving rate rises. 
We see from section 2.1 and 2.2 that the model predicts both real interest rate and consumption 
inequality are increasing in income heterogeneity    (  ). Panel C of Figure 3.1 presents a 
more straightforward display of how equilibrium interest rate is correlated with inequality. At 
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each level of individual income risk    ⁄ , the interest rate curve, plotted against inequality, has 
a positive slope. Additionally, higher values of    ⁄  results in lower interest rate curves in the 
graph, telling us that interest rate is decreasing in the magnitude of income risks in this model. 
On the other hand, consumption inequality is higher as    ⁄  gets larger.  
Panel D of Figure 3.1 plots interest rate   against both the size of average individual income risks    ⁄  , and the dispersion in individual income risks    (  ). Interestingly, as seen earlier,    ⁄  
and    (  ) has opposite effects on the value of  . Intuitively, larger size of labor income risks 
(  ) raises the average consumption risk and hence increases the precautionary saving motive. 
Consequently it lowers the interest rate. In contrast, the diversity in labor income risks (    (  )) 
facilitates risk sharing among agents and lowers the average consumption risk and in turn raises 
the interest rate. So while both    and    (  )  boost inequality, only if the effect of high    (  ) outweighs the effect of high    can we see a higher interest rate. 
In conclusion, the numerical results complement and confirm the analytical results from earlier 
sections. They are in line with the intuition that income heterogeneity promotes risk sharing 
through the diversification effect. As the individual income risks become more dispersed, both 
consumption inequality and interest rate rise over a plausible region of the parameter space. In 
addition, the results also confirm two risk sharing measures as proxies for income heterogeneity: 
the gross saving rates and the ratio of income risk to consumption risks.  In the following section, 
these two variables are added to the interest rate-inequality regression to test if they cut down the 
positive role of inequality in explaining interest rate. 
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3.3 Empirical Analysis 
The purpose of this empirical study is to examine whether the positive interest rate-inequality 
relationship in Chapter 2 is driven by the positive influence of income heterogeneity on both. 
Income heterogeneity    (  ), defined as the dispersion in idiosyncratic labor income risk in the 
model, raises equilibrium interest rate by promoting risk sharing and smoothing consumption. 
Two other quantities that capture this effect are the ratio of average labor income risk to average 
consumption risk and saving rate. If the actual data of inequality, saving rate and the risk ratio do 
reflect the income heterogeneity to some degree and if the risk sharing story is true, then the 
addition of either saving rates or the         ⁄  ratio to the interest rate-inequality regression should 
reduce the positive coefficient on income inequality. 
Specifically, the following regression will be run to test the theory above: 
  , =   +   ∗            , +   ∗      ℎ    ,        ⁄             ,   
+∑    ∗         +   ,                                                                                            (13) 
And the hypothesis is that α  be smaller and less significant compared to the regression without 
the    terms and    be non-zero. 
3.3.1 Data and Variables 
The dependent variable In Equation (13) is real interest rate (“rrf”). T-bill rates are obtained from 
IMF and I adjust them to real terms with inflation data from World Bank. For the country-years 
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where T-bill rates are not available, I create the “pseudo” T-bill rates by subtracting from the 
prime rates the cross-country average of spread between prime (lending) rates and T-bill rates.30  
The income inequality measure here is the income Gini coefficient from the “All-the-Ginis” 
dataset compiled by Branko Milanovic from World Bank, which contains 1541 consistent Gini 
values from 154 countries covering 1950 to 2008. Compared to other sources of income 
distribution data, “All-the-Ginis” has advantage in the size of the samples, reliability of the data 
source and the clarity in of the welfare concepts and measurements31. All the data in my sample 
are estimated in per capita units and adjusted to be consistent with measure of the disparity in net 
(disposable) income.32 
 “     ℎ    , ” is the ratio of the average income risk to consumption risk, i.e.         ⁄ ,  which 
demonstrate the general risk sharing effect due to income heterogeneity. Ideally, this measure 
should be constructed with micro-level income and consumption data within each country. 
However due to limitations on data, I use aggregate level income and consumption data from 
World Bank to construct it. The data covers 45 countries over 49 years(1958-2007). For the best 
data availability, per capital annual GDP and per capital consumption data are used. Specifically, 
in each year  , I calculate for each country   the volatility in GDP growth and in consumption 
                                                          
30 In unreported regressions, I also use prime rates from WDI database of World Banks instead of T-bill rates as dependent variable, 
or repeat the regressions on the subsample of country-years where the T-bill rates are available. The results remain substantially 
unchanged. 
31 The dataset is compiled from five other Gini databases, including Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Socio-Economic Database for 
Latin America (SEDLAC), World Income Distribution (WYD), World Bank Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and WIDER (WIID I ) 
databases. Only the data that come from nationally-representative household survey are selected. When there is conflict in data from 
two or more different sources for the same country-year, data are chosen according to the reliability and the degree of standardization 
of the source. All the data in the resulted “All-the-Ginis” dataset have clear description of welfare concepts (income or 
expenditure/consumption, net or gross) and unit of receipients (per capita or per household). 
32 I follow Dollar and Kraay(2002) and adjust both datasets to ensure the consistency in welfare concepts. I regress the inequality 
measures on a constant, a set of regional dummies including are Asia, Africa, Latin America, and East Europe (so the “Western” 
countries are in the omitted category) and two dummy variables indicating whether the measure is based on gross income or 
consumption. Then I subtract the estimated mean difference between the alternative welfare concepts-based inequality measures and 
the omitted category. My main results do not change much if I 1. Completely ignoring the differences in welfare concepts, and 2. 
Include the dummy variables of welfare concepts directly in regressions. 
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growth over a 9-year rolling window centered on  . The variable “     ℎ    , ” is then defined 
as the log of the ratio of volatility in per capital GDP growth to the volatility in per capita 
consumption growth. 
“           , ” is the Gross saving rate as percentage of gross national income (GNI) of 45 
countries from 1965-2010 from World Bank. Gross savings are calculated as GNI less total 
consumption, plus net transfers.  
Other control variables are the same as in Chapter 2. They are either common risk factors 
adopted in asset pricing literature or country characteristics that may affect both pricing and 
income inequality. For example, I have dividend growth (“div_g”), where the annual dividends 
are calculated using MSCI equity price and total returns indices.  Market volatilities (“vol”) are 
computed as the volatility of the MSCI equity index’s returns over the 36-months window 
centering on the December. “gdppercap” is annual GDP per Capita (real) from WDI database, 
an indicator of a country’s economic conditions.  Stock market turnover ratio (“stturnover”) and 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (“llgdp”) are used to characterize a country’s development 
in stock market and banking system, respectively33. These two are commonly used indicators 
(see Beck et al.(2000), Beck and Levine(2004), etc.) of a country’s financial market development. 
The data are obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (BKL)’s Database of Financial 
Development and Structure, an updated version of Beck et al.(2000). “legal” and “icrg10” are 
two proxies of a country’s development of legal regime and overall political risk. Following 
Doidge et al.(2007) and Durnev and Kim(2005), “legal” is defined as the product of “anti-
                                                          
33 Stturnover is the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges divided by total value of listed shares, a measure of market 
liquidity. Liquid liabilities are calculated as currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities financial intermediaries and 
nonbank financial intermediaries. 
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director rights index” and “rule-of-law”34. “icrg10” is a composite country risk index from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that incorporates a comprehensive list of political and 
social condition measures 35 . I account for the demographic feature of a country that may 
influence income distribution by “age65”, a variable that measures the fraction of the population 
that’s 65 years or older. The variable “tax” is cited from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries and 
is the marginal personal income tax rate for the highest-income tier.  
If the global market is fully integrated, then the domestic factors do not really matter for pricing. 
Therefore two measures of global market segmentation are included: Foreign investability (“fb”) 
measures how easy the foreign investors can invest in domestic market, and home bias (“hb”) 
measures how insufficiently diversified are domestic investors across global market.  I follow 
Lau et al.(2010) and define “fb” as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity 
held by foreign investors divided by the country’s total market capitalization. Similarly, “hb” is 
defined as the share of domestic investors’ holdings of their domestic stocks relative to the 
weight of the country’s market capitalization in the world market. The equity holdings data are 
from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of IMF. 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.1A, 1B and Table 3.2. 
                                                          
34 The former measures investor protection and shareholder rights and the data is from Djankov et al.(2008); the latter are measures 
of law enforcement from (López de Silanes et al.(1998)).   
35 Specifically, the ICRG composite risk index incorporates the following measures: government stability, military in politics, 
socioeconomic conditions, religious tensions, investment profile, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, external conflict, democratic 
accountability, corruption and bureaucracy quality. 
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3.3.2 Proxies for Income Heterogeneity 
Section 2 shows that saving rate captures income heterogeneity’s risk sharing effect and can be 
used as a proxy for the unobserved income heterogeneity in empirical study. The results of 
regressions with saving rates are reported in Table 3.3.  
For easier comparison, Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the original results of real interest rate (“rrf”) 
on income inequality and other variables from Chapter 2, and Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the 
corresponding results for the same models with saving rates. The stand-out observation is that 
across all models, the addition of saving rates to the regression reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficients on inequality terms. For example, Model 1 and 2 are the simplest regressions of 
interest rate on income Gini and/or the interaction term of Gini coefficient with the developed 
country indicator. When saving rate is added to the models, coefficient on inequality measure 
itself is lowered from about 0.22 to about 0.17, a reduction of nearly 1/3. Without the saving rate, 
a one standard deviation increase in Gini (which is about 0.0936) implies an increase of roughly 2% 
in the real interest rate; after take into account for the saving rate, the same increase in Gini 
yields a growth of 1.53% in interest rate. In most of the models with more regressors, saving rate 
takes even more away of the positive effect of inequality on interest rate. As for the interaction 
terms of inequality with the dummy “developed”, although the results in the original regressions 
are economically small and not significant in most cases, adding saving rate to the models further 
lowers the value of the coefficient as well as the t-statistics. In the full regression models with 
global integration measures (Model 6 and 7), the signs of the coefficients are reversed and there 
is a substantial decrease in the value of the t-statistics (from nearly 1 to -0.13). 
                                                          
36 Note that in all regressions the “Giniall” variable is the actual Gini value (which is between 0 and 1) multiplied by 100. 
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Another interesting observation is that when adding the variable “Age65” to the regression in 
Panel B models (with saving rates), there is a remarkable drop in both the economic and 
statistical significance of the coefficient on income Gini. From Model 4 to Model 5, the estimate 
of this coefficient is lowered from 0.17 to 0.1 and t-statistics from 2.67 to 1.31. Age effect on 
portfolio holdings has been discussed in many studies (some examples are Jagannathan and 
Kocherlakota(1996),  Heaton and Lucas(2000) and Benzoni et al.(2007)). The general agreement 
is that stockholdings are hump-shaped over the lifecycle and retirement is the typical turning 
point from increasing to declining stockholdings. “Age65” can be roughly redeemed a measure 
of the fraction of the retired people in the economy. So it is likely that it works together with 
saving rate measure to isolate the risk sharing effect of income heterogeneity on interest rate. 
Another indicator that may exemplify the risk sharing effect of income heterogeneity is (the log 
of) ratio of the average income risk to the average consumption risk, log(Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC)). 
Compared to the saving rate, which reflects only the risk sharing effect of income heterogeneity 
in the bond market, this ratio is more of a general risk sharing measure. It is an indicator of the 
overall consumption smoothing effect from risk sharing through all channels, including the stock 
market, the bond market and others.  
I repeat the regressions in Table 3.3 with the exception of replacing saving rate with the income-
consumption risk ratio (“riskshare”). If both income inequality and the ratio defined above really 
catch the within-country heterogeneity and its boosting effect on risk sharing at least to some 
degree, then we should see a positive coefficient on this risk sharing and a smaller and/or less 
significant coefficient on the inequality measure.  
The results are presented in Table 3.4. 
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A quick look at Table 3.4 tells us that including this ratio to the interest rate-inequality regression 
does not alter the results too much from the original regression. In fact, the coefficients on 
income Gini and the interaction term between Gini and “developed” remain roughly the same in 
both their economic magnitude and statistical significance. This is not surprising considering that 
this measure “riskshare” itself is not really significant in the regressions (except for in Model 6 
& 7 where the global risk sharing indicators are included). 
For better comparison, I include both the saving rate and the ratio of income risk to consumption 
risk to the original regression and report the results in Table 3.5. 
 
Results in Table 3.5 confirm my findings in Table 3.3 and 4. The inclusion of saving rate to the 
models lowers the values of coefficients on Gini itself by about 1/3 and reduces both the size and 
values of the t-stats of coefficients on the interaction term; while the general risk sharing 
measure “riskshare” is not working as expected and has almost no effect on the coefficient of 
inequality terms. 
3.3.3 Discussions 
The previous section reveals some results that are consistent with the hypothesis that income 
heterogeneity drives the observed positive relation between real interest rate and income 
inequality. In particular, Table 3.3 and 3.5 shows that the addition of gross saving rates to the 
regression takes away part of the positive effect of the inequality on interest rate. This can be 
viewed as supporting evidence of the model result that saving rate captures part of the positive 
effect of income heterogeneity on interest rate that is also displayed through interest rate-
inequality correlation.  
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However, one concern is that an alternative interpretation may be proposed as follows: In under-
developed countries with very low average income, some people are so poor that their income is 
barely enough to cover the subsistence. In this case, higher inequality may indicate that this kind 
of people, who are too poor to save, makes up a larger fraction of the population.  This also 
means inequality has a negative effect on the demand for saving and positive effect on the 
interest rates, especially in developing countries. In Table 3.3 and 5, the dampening effect of 
adding saving rate on the positive interest rate-inequality correlation does seem to be more 
pronounced in the developing countries. Therefore this interpretation seems quite plausible. 
However, this explanation is hard to reconcile with the documented fact that household saving 
rate is higher in developing countries than in developed countries (Modigliani and Cao(2004), 
Gormley et al.(2010)). 
Another concern about the regression results in Table 3.3 and 3.5 is, while they confirm that 
adding saving rate to the regressions induces smaller coefficients and t-statistics on income Gini, 
the numbers need to be viewed with caution due to the endogeneity of regressing interest rate on 
saving rate. For this reason, this paper tries to avoid interpreting the coefficient on saving rate 
itself. It should be kept in mind that the estimates and inference on income inequality can also be 
affected by endogeneity and thus conclusions should be drawn only with great caution. 
Proceeding to the regressions in Table 3.4 and 3.5 with “riskshare”, there may be several 
explanations for the unsatisfying results. One of them is that the constructed variable “riskshare” 
may not be a proper indicator of within-country heterogeneity because it is created with 
aggregate data instead of micro-level data. And the inadequate measure may potentially cause 
unreliable estimates of coefficients both on the measure itself and on income inequality. A more 
accurate measure would be to first compute the volatility (or variance) in consumption growth 
92 
 
and the volatility (or variance) in income growth for each household and then find the cross-
sectional average of the ratios. A second possible explanation is that although the variable 
“riskshare” embodies the risk sharing effect of heterogeneity, the income inequality measure on 
the other hand bears no connection to this effect and reflects other different aspects of the interest 
rate-heterogeneity relation. Finally, these results could be pointing to a different direction in 
rationalizing and modeling the observed positive relationship between interest rate and inequality. 
To further test which of these explanations is true, better instrument for within-country income 
heterogeneity is needed. For example, the income risk to consumption risk ratio may be 
constructed with household level income and consumption data from Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) in future studies. Industry 
composition data of each country, if available, may also be utilized to create indicator of cross-
sectional variation in income within the country. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The existing literatures have in general suggested that higher income inequality lead to lower 
interest rate. However in Chapter 2, I find a significant positive correlation between cross-
country differences in income inequality and cross-country differences in real interest rates. 
In this paper, I try to explain this observation under an asset pricing model with CARA utility 
function, income heterogeneity and untradable labor income risks. In this model, the income 
heterogeneity is defined as the dispersion in idiosyncratic income risks in terms of their 
correlations to the aggregate risk. I conjecture that given the channels of risk sharing, higher 
dispersion in the idiosyncratic income risks promotes risk sharing through diversification. 
Therefore agents have smoother consumption on average and reduced precautionary saving 
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motive. As a result, the equilibrium interest rate of the economy declines as the heterogeneity 
increases. If higher income risk dispersion also contributes to higher inequality, then the 
observed correlation between inequality and interest rate may be reflecting the effect of 
heterogeneity on the latter. With the assumption of CARA utility, I am able to derive the risk-
free rate and the (consumption) inequality in closed-form solutions and show that both are 
positively related to income heterogeneity. In addition, two other proxies for income 
heterogeneity are established from the model to be used in the empirical analysis: the gross 
saving rate and a general risk sharing measure, the ratio of average consumption risk to average 
income risk.  
The evidence from the empirical tests is mixed. On one hand the results confirm that saving rate 
helps reducing the positive role of income inequality in explaining higher interest rate, providing 
supporting evidence that income heterogeneity drives both inequality and real interest rate. On 
the other hand, the test results with ratio of consumption risk to income risk are not collaborating 
with the above theory. However, this may be partly caused by the deficiency in the constructed 
measure due to the use of aggregate data. In the future, international micro-level household 
income and consumption data may be used to create better within-country heterogeneity proxies 
for further examination.  
While there is no explicit role for insurance market within the model, the implicit implication 
would be that they also play an important role in determining the equilibrium portfolio holdings 
as well as pricing. The diversification effect of income heterogeneity is amplified when such risk 
sharing channels as both the financial markets and social insurance system are well developed. 
Also, although this paper only targets to explain how heterogeneity in the covariance between 
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individual and aggregate risks may drive both the interest rate and inequality, it is possible to 
extend the model to evaluate the effect of heterogeneity on portfolio decision and risk premium.  
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Appendix: Monthly West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Crude Oil Price Since 1973 
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CHAPTER 1 FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: This Figure 1.plots the realized covariance of CRSP market returns with log changes in expenditure on non-energy consumptions 
and covariance of CRSP returns with log changes in real WTI oil prices from 1947-2008 
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Figure 1.2: This Figure 1.plots the quarterly log expenditure ratio of NIPA non-energy/ energy consumption and log CPI_non-
energy/CPI_energy from 1957-2009. A positive correlation between the two series implies small (close to zero) intratemporal 
elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
2.0000
3.0000
4.0000
R
at
io
s
Date
Log expenditure ratio (non-energy/energy)
Log Price Ratio (CPI_nonenergy/CPI_energy commodity)
103 
 
Figure 1.3: This Figure 1.plots the fitted daily conditional covariance of CRSP value-weighted market returns with changes in oil/non-oil 
expenditure ratios from 1983-2008. The parameters are estimated from the following conditional variances and correlation equations 
in the benchmark (un-normalized) model: 
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Figure 1.4.a: This Figure 1.plots the realized volatility(1983-2008) of CRSP market returns against the fitted volatility of CRSP market returns 
from the following EGARCH equation in the benchmark (un-normalized) model: 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)s s s s s s s s s z s zh t a b h t c r t d r t e r t f r t= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -  
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Figure 1.4.b: This Figure 1.plots the realized volatility(1983-2008) of changes in oil/non-oil expenditure ratios against the fitted volatility of 
expenditure ratios from the following EGARCH equation in the benchmark (un-normalized) model: 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)z z z z z z z z z s z sh t a b h t c r t d r t e r t f r t= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -  
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Figure 1.4.c: This Figure 1.plots the realized correlation(1983-2008) of CRSP market returns with changes in oil/non-oil expenditure ratios 
against the fitted correlation from the following equation in benchmark (un-normalized) DCC model 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
where ( ) tanh( ( )),  and ( ) is the correlation between  & 
p p p s p z p s z
s z
p t a b p t c r t d r t e r t r t
p t a t t r rr r
= + × - + × - + × - + × - × -
=
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
-0.75
-0.5
-0.25
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
co
rr
el
at
io
n
Date
Model correlation b/w CRSP stock returns & pct change in expenditure ratio (from CPI_EC)
Realized correlation b/w CRSP stock returns & pct change in expenditure ratio (from
CPI_EC)
107 
 
Figure 1.5: This Figure 1.plots the realized correlation(1983-2008) of CRSP market returns with changes in oil/non-oil expenditure ratios 
against the fitted correlation from the following equation in the NORMALIZED DCC model 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
where ( ) tanh( ( )),   ( ) is the correlation & 's are returns scaled by its EGARCH volatilities
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Figure 1.6: This Figure 1.plots the fitted daily conditional covariance of CRSP value-weighted market returns with changes in 
oil/non-oil expenditure ratios from 1983-2008. The parameters are estimated from the following conditional variances and 
correlation equations in the NORMALIZED model: 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
s s s s s s s s s z s z
z z z z z z z z z s z s
h t a b h t c t d t e t f t
h t a b h t c t d t e t f t
x x x x
x x x x
= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -
= + × - + × - + × - + × - + × -
 & 
( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)p p p s p z p s zp t a b p t c t d t e t tx x x x= + × - + × - + × - + × - × -  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0005
-0.0004
-0.0003
-0.0002
-0.0001
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
C
ov
ar
ia
nc
e
Date
Conditional covariance b/w CRSP returns & percent change in
expenditure ratio
Iraq War 
Mar 2003
Terrorist Attacks
Sept 2001
Persian Gulf War
Aug 1990
OPEC Collapse
Dec 1985
Opec Quota
Increase
Nov 2000
109 
 
Figure 1.7a: In this figure, I compare the fitted conditional covariance series from UN-NORMALIZED model using three different 
combinations of price/consumption expenditure data: 1. CPI_energy commodity & NIPA expenditure data on oil 
products and other energy goods; 2. CPI_energy & NIPA expenditure data on energy goods and services; 3. WTI crude 
oil price series & NIPA expenditure data on oil products and other energy goods 
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Figure 1.7b: In this figure, I compare the fitted conditional covariance series from NORMALIZED model using three different 
combinations of price/consumption expenditure data: 1. CPI_energy commodity & NIPA expenditure data on oil products 
and other energy goods; 2. CPI_energy & NIPA expenditure data on energy goods and services; 3. WTI crude oil price 
series & NIPA expenditure data on oil products and other energy goods 
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CHAPTER 2 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 2.1             
Giniall is the Income Gini measure from Dataset of Branko Milanovic. WIID2 Gini is Income Gini from WIID2 database by 
WIDER. WIID2 IR is the ratio of the income of the top 10% income population to the total income of the rest population.  
MSCI P/D is the price dividend ratio computed from MSCI international equity indices. GFD P/D is the inverse of dividend 
yield of each country from Global Financial Data (GFD). 
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Income Inequality and Stock Market P/D 
    Income Inequality Stock Market P/D 
Country /Region Type of Market Giniall WIID2 Gini WIID2 IR MSCI P/D GFD P/D 
Australia DEV 35.48 32.01 0.31 26.17 21.91 
Austria DEV 31.39 25.98 0.27 49.38 46.32 
Belgium DEV 27.44 27.76 0.29 23.29 29.16 
Brazil EMG 58.05 57.47 0.89 29.61 28.79 
Canada DEV 32.24 30.11 0.33 38.75 37.68 
Chile EMG 53.97 54.20 0.81 33.06 27.02 
China EMG 36.19 40.55 0.47 117.54 64.71 
Colombia EMG 54.98 57.26 0.88 33.59 39.55 
Czech Republic EMG 23.35 22.07 0.23 51.84 57.38 
Denmark DEV 32.51 25.20 0.33 48.66 48.02 
Egypt EMG 37.38 36.57 0.40 29.16 36.99 
Finland DEV 29.84 24.29 0.26 60.15 30.61 
France DEV 37.18 31.53 0.33 40.16 28.32 
Germany DEV 33.19 31.63 0.30 43.14 32.99 
Greece DEV 36.00 34.08 0.34 41.46 26.03 
Hong Kong  DEV 42.93 44.49 0.51 30.34 50.29 
Hungary EMG 26.83 25.06 0.26 79.52 56.11 
India EMG 34.67 33.16 0.49 73.92 72.30 
Indonesia EMG 36.43 34.07 0.44 50.42 78.62 
Ireland DEV 35.84 33.05 0.35 45.09 45.76 
Israel DEV 37.81 35.92 0.37 63.14 39.63 
Italy DEV 36.08 35.47 0.37 38.95 36.18 
Japan DEV 32.99 35.35 0.39 95.03 96.67 
Korea, Rep. EMG 33.84 36.19 0.36 74.31 42.64 
Malaysia EMG 47.08 49.72 0.63 58.91 72.58 
Mexico EMG 52.75 52.36 0.70 62.08 62.74 
Morocco EMG 37.40 51.64 0.58 33.09 40.53 
Netherlands DEV 30.27 28.76 0.31 26.04 25.85 
New Zealand DEV 35.32 32.13 0.38 19.79 59.45 
Norway DEV 31.58 29.66 0.30 38.69 38.58 
Peru EMG 50.73 51.25 0.68 55.03 47.37 
Philippines EMG 46.30 47.59 0.60 112.99 71.26 
Poland EMG 29.80 30.56 0.31 104.74 78.91 
Portugal DEV 36.70 37.18 0.39 36.62 38.30 
Russian Federation EMG 35.80 34.94 0.51 138.29 106.12 
Singapore DEV 40.62     51.97 51.67 
South Africa EMG 60.49 59.00   38.35 30.44 
Spain DEV 31.83 32.71 0.35 27.51 25.72 
Sweden DEV 28.47 23.67 0.27 40.21 37.81 
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Table 2.1 Panel A (cont.) 
 
 
Switzerland DEV 33.20 32.38 0.38 52.11 47.15 
Taiwan EMG 30.19 30.47 0.32 81.58 104.91 
Thailand EMG 44.11 44.53 0.57 64.40 32.40 
Turkey EMG 46.48 50.68   42.73 42.26 
United Kingdom DEV 33.56 29.05 0.30 27.35 25.81 
United States DEV 35.74 40.47 0.37 39.34 33.87 
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Table 2.1 Panel B 
gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ediv_g is the expected dividend growth rate 
computed from MSCI Equity Index, MSCI Total Returns and Net Returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from 
BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from 
PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country composite risk rating in Jan. 2010 from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old 
from World Bank. tax is the persona income tax rates from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Other Control Variables 
Country /Region gdppercap rrf ediv_g vol Inflation llgdp stturnover age65 Legal icrg10 tax 
Australia 17137 2.90 0.08 0.07 5.31 0.51 0.57 10.48 3.67 78.00 45.00 
Austria 17108 1.06 0.15 0.06 3.57 0.72 0.48 14.77 2.50 82.00 50.00 
Belgium 16534 3.47 0.06 0.06 3.86 0.58 0.28 14.74 1.67 80.00 50.00 
Brazil 2928 12.40 0.22 0.12 11.04 0.44 0.43 4.56 1.67 72.25 27.50 
Canada 17849 2.27 0.07 0.06 4.21 0.68 0.53 10.27 3.67 81.75 50.00 
Chile 3258   0.11 0.07   0.35 0.09 6.16 3.33 75.50 40.00 
China 525 -1.39 0.72 0.10 6.10   1.15 5.50 0.75 76.75 45.00 
Colombia 1972 11.15 0.22 0.09 16.72 0.24 0.08 4.09 1.00 65.50 33.00 
Czech Republic 5795 0.54 0.50 0.08 4.83 0.66 0.50 12.64 3.33 72.75 15.00 
Denmark 22202 5.44 0.08 0.06 5.23 0.50 0.58 14.02 4.00 82.00 51.50 
Egypt 990 -0.36 0.23 0.09 9.39 0.63 0.19 3.74 1.17 66.75 20.00 
Finland 16955 0.93 0.18 0.08 5.38 0.48 0.69 12.16 3.50 80.75 51.00 
France 16319 1.75 0.09 0.06 4.77 0.63 0.69 14.16 2.50 75.50 40.00 
Germany 18801 2.20 0.10 0.06 1.93 0.66 1.19 15.19 2.08 80.50 42.00 
Greece 9243 0.95 0.35 0.10 9.77 0.51 0.27 13.44 1.50 70.25 40.00 
Hong Kong  15797 0.26 0.10 0.10 4.55 2.13 0.49 7.47 4.17 81.25 16.00 
Hungary 3674 2.36 0.28 0.11 10.94 0.46 0.57 13.06 1.33 67.25 32.00 
India 321 4.06 0.09 0.09 7.66 0.38 0.81 3.76 3.33 70.50 30.90 
Indonesia 593 5.97 0.16 0.14 12.49 0.30 0.31 4.07 2.00 67.00 30.00 
Ireland 14362 1.03 0.05 0.06 6.49 0.64 0.46 11.09 4.00 73.25 41.00 
Israel 14069 0.99 0.23 0.07 14.22 0.67 0.57 8.31 3.33 68.75 44.00 
Italy 13880 2.88 0.07 0.07 6.82 0.65 0.90 14.47 1.67 74.25 43.00 
Japan 26035 0.27 0.07 0.06 3.59 1.50 0.70 11.62 2.92 81.00 40.00 
Korea, Rep. 6246 1.01 0.15 0.10 8.34 0.42 1.40 5.23 2.92 75.50 38.50 
Malaysia 2499 1.54 0.10 0.08 3.22 0.81 0.33 3.73 3.33 74.50 26.00 
Mexico 4678 3.93 0.24 0.09 16.70 0.26 0.36 4.37 1.00 69.25 30.00 
Morocco 1070 1.78 0.12 0.05 4.87 0.53 0.14 4.13   73.25 38.00 
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Table 2.1 Panel B (cont.) 
 
Netherlands 17365 2.13 0.08 0.05 3.79 0.72 0.98 11.94 3.00 81.00 52.00 
New Zealand 11307 2.88 0.02 0.08 6.38 0.49 0.33 10.22 3.67 75.25 39.00 
Norway 25510 3.52 0.11 0.08 5.04 0.53 0.75 14.35 3.50 89.50 40.00 
Peru 2126 18.22 0.34 0.09 22.15 0.26 0.16 4.12 2.04 69.00 30.00 
Philippines 884 2.60 0.30 0.09 9.72 0.33 0.25 3.27 1.25 68.50 32.00 
Poland 4417 -2.18 0.40 0.14 14.72 0.38 0.51 9.96 1.50 75.00 32.00 
Portugal 7164 -2.22 0.10 0.07 9.60 0.94 0.37 12.44 2.08 71.00 45.88 
Russian Federation 2219 0.21 0.51 0.15 22.54 0.25 0.35 9.92 2.67 66.50 13.00 
Singapore 13020 0.29 0.11 0.08 2.68 0.78 0.56 5.29 4.17 82.50 20.00 
South Africa 3105 0.61 0.09 0.08 8.70 0.51 0.25 3.52 2.08 70.00 40.00 
Spain 10088 2.96 0.07 0.06 7.64 0.75 1.14 12.64 4.17 70.75 43.00 
Sweden 21326 2.04 0.13 0.07 5.03 0.51 0.81 15.96 3.50 82.00 57.77 
Switzerland 29258 1.08 0.11 0.05 2.96 1.14 0.88 13.60 2.50 84.75 32.30 
Taiwan     0.10 0.11     2.12   2.50 80.00   
Thailand 1215 2.22 0.19 0.11 4.80 0.65 0.67 4.68 1.67 65.00 37.00 
Turkey 3011   0.12 0.17 33.44 0.27 0.99 4.53 1.50 63.50 35.00 
United Kingdom 18404 1.46 0.07 0.06 6.08 0.62 0.65 14.64 4.58 73.75 40.00 
United States 25549 1.24 0.05 0.04 4.16 0.68 1.20 11.30 2.50 76.75 35.00 
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Table 2.2: Pearson's Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
Giniall is the Income Gini measure from World Bank Dataset “All-the-Ginis” compiled by Branko Milanovic. WIID2 Gini is Income Gini from WIID2 database by WIDER. 
WIID2 IR is the ratio of the income of the top 10% income population to the total income of the rest population. MSCI P/D is the price dividend ratio computed from MSCI 
international equity indices. GFD P/D is the inverse of dividend yield of each country from Global Financial Data (GFD). gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's 
WDI database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ediv_g is the expected dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity Index, MSCI Total Returns and Net 
Returns indices. Vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio 
is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country composite risk rating in Jan. 2010 from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the persona income tax rates from PWC’s Worldwide Tax 
Summaries. 
Variable MSCI P/D 
GFD 
P/D Giniall 
WIID2 
Gini 
WIID2 
IR 
GDP 
per 
Capita 
rrf ediv_g vol Inflation llgdp stturnover age65 Legal icrg10 tax 
MSCI P/D 1.000                               
GFD P/D 0.516 1.000                             
Giniall -0.050 -0.074 1.000                           
WIID2 Gini -0.009 -0.017 0.912 1.000                         
WIID2 IR -0.023 -0.010 0.943 0.953 1.000                       
gdppercap -0.052 -0.027 -0.444 -0.485 -0.568 1.000                     
rrf -0.032 0.078 0.315 0.345 0.477 -0.087 1.000                   
ediv_g 0.598 0.111 0.035 0.027 0.044 -0.100 -0.049 1.000                 
vol 0.266 0.290 0.142 0.170 0.209 -0.383 0.107 0.043 1.000               
Inflation 0.112 0.011 0.110 0.117 0.131 -0.306 -0.236 0.047 0.506 1.000             
llgdp 0.069 0.077 -0.245 -0.146 -0.252 0.576 -0.163 -0.075 -0.261 -0.317 1.000           
stturnover 0.045 0.280 -0.271 -0.202 -0.292 0.313 -0.159 -0.053 0.155 -0.098 0.157 1.000         
age65 -0.078 -0.078 -0.588 -0.663 -0.695 0.756 -0.066 -0.050 -0.345 -0.261 0.370 0.260 1.000       
Legal -0.130 -0.034 -0.269 -0.397 -0.357 0.436 -0.051 -0.101 -0.248 -0.252 0.240 0.108 0.279 1.000     
icrg10 -0.066 -0.018 -0.400 -0.434 -0.426 0.690 -0.090 -0.077 -0.352 -0.365 0.351 0.232 0.495 0.484 1.000   
tax -0.104 -0.162 -0.307 -0.420 -0.408 0.369 -0.020 -0.066 -0.330 -0.150 -0.035 0.162 0.440 0.117 0.384 1.000 
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Table 2.3: MSCI P/D ratio vs. Income Gini from World Bank "All-the-Ginis" Dataset  
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are the lagged, present and expected 
dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index 
returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. 
Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country composite risk 
rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. 
tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries.       , =   +   ∗            , +   ∗          , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
  Dependent Variable: MSCI P/D 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
giniall_adj -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
  -(2.82) -(1.84) -(1.94) -(1.97) -(1.80) -(2.72) -(2.47) 
giniall_adj * developed     0.00   -0.01   -0.01 
      -(0.89)   -(2.61)   -(2.76) 
gdppercap       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        (0.91) (1.72) (1.75) (2.59) 
rrf   -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
    -(3.01) -(3.11) -(2.31) -(2.70) -(2.53) -(2.92) 
inflation   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
    -(0.51) -(0.80) -(0.92) -(1.92) -(1.27) -(2.23) 
div_g   -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
    -(1.42) -(1.58) -(1.89) -(2.24) -(2.08) -(2.67) 
ldiv_g   -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 
    -(2.66) -(2.88) -(0.67) -(0.87) -(1.13) -(1.41) 
ediv_g   0.27 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 
    (4.50) (4.62) (4.46) (5.31) (4.52) (5.24) 
vol   5.00 4.44 8.05 7.31 7.42 6.73 
    (2.72) (2.15) (3.94) (3.88) (3.72) (3.69) 
legal       -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 
        -(1.06) -(0.59) -(1.23) -(0.72) 
llgdp       0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 
        (0.19) (0.10) -(0.27) -(0.43) 
stturnover       -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 
        -(0.16) -(0.77) -(0.10) -(0.65) 
icrg10       0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
        (0.11) -(0.44) (0.02) -(0.55) 
age65           -0.01 0.00 
            -(0.77) -(0.19) 
tax           -0.01 -0.01 
            -(1.69) -(1.80) 
nobs 480 366 366 238 238 238 238 
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Table 2.3 (cont.) 
 
 
r-squared 0.063 0.239 0.244 0.373 0.414 0.397 0.436 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered 
Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.4: GFD PD ratio vs. Income Gini from World Bank "All-the-Ginis" Dataset  
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are the lagged, present and expected 
dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index 
returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from 
BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country 
composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old 
from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. 
      , =   +   ∗            , +   ∗          , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
  Dependent Variable: GFD P/D Ratio 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
giniall_adj -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  -(2.25) -(1.23) -(1.35) -(1.37) -(1.15) -(2.68) -(2.31) 
giniall_adj * 
developed     -0.01   -0.02   -0.02 
      -(1.33)   -(2.85)   -(3.01) 
gdppercap       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        (0.45) (1.46) (1.40) (2.25) 
rrf   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
    -(1.91) -(2.12) -(1.36) -(1.69) -(1.57) -(1.90) 
inflation   -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
    -(0.80) -(1.22) (0.18) -(0.65) (0.02) -(0.82) 
div_g   0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
    (0.42) (0.34) -(0.04) -(0.22) -(0.06) -(0.31) 
ldiv_g   -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
    -(0.94) -(1.21) -(0.20) -(0.36) -(0.60) -(0.81) 
ediv_g   0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
    (0.48) (0.48) (0.26) (0.50) (0.23) (0.29) 
vol   5.64 4.83 6.64 5.77 5.88 5.10 
    (3.37) (2.51) (2.66) (2.50) (2.48) (2.33) 
legal       -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 
        -(1.20) -(0.70) -(1.42) -(0.88) 
llgdp       0.10 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 
        (0.35) (0.30) -(0.11) -(0.22) 
stturnover       -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.09 
        -(0.28) -(1.05) -(0.31) -(1.00) 
icrg10       0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
        (0.91) (0.17) (0.84) (0.13) 
age65           -0.02 -0.01 
            -(1.37) -(0.76) 
tax           -0.01 -0.01 
            -(1.44) -(1.64) 
nobs 526 365 365 238 238 238 238 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
 
r-squared 0.037 0.114 0.126 0.213 0.277 0.254 0.310 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for 
Clustered Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.5:  Home Bias and Foreign Investability 
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are the lagged, present and expected 
dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index 
returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from 
BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country 
composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old 
from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ 
holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign 
investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s 
total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
    5A: Dependent Variable: MSCI P/D ratio   5B: Dependent Variable: GFD P/D Ratio 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
giniall_adj   -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03   -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
    -(3.19) -(0.61) -(2.64) -(3.87)   -(2.44) -(1.12) -(1.83) -(3.81) 
giniall_adj * 
developed   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    -(2.25) -(2.77) -(2.12) -(3.14)   -(1.76) -(1.76) -(1.65) -(2.70) 
gdppercap   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (1.21) (1.46) (1.78) (2.37)   (0.57) (0.55) (1.04) (1.61) 
rrf   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04   -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
    -(3.29) -(3.40) -(4.16) -(4.55)   -(2.33) -(2.30) -(2.76) -(3.00) 
inflation   -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03   0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
    -(2.22) -(2.27) -(2.25) -(3.13)   -(0.03) -(0.02) -(0.06) -(0.33) 
div_g   -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31   -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 
    -(3.62) -(3.82) -(3.72) -(3.81)   -(1.35) -(1.34) -(1.28) -(1.41) 
ldiv_g   -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17   -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 
    -(1.99) -(1.96) -(1.86) -(2.41)   -(0.72) -(0.72) -(0.66) -(1.20) 
ediv_g   0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 
    (2.52) (2.52) (2.22) (1.60)   -(0.09) -(0.09) -(0.11) -(0.46) 
vol   7.42 7.50 7.29 7.87   3.12 3.12 3.07 3.72 
    (3.96) (4.03) (3.56) (4.10)   (1.30) (1.30) (1.25) (1.54) 
legal   -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03   -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 
    -(0.91) -(0.91) -(0.79) -(0.46)   -(0.62) -(0.62) -(0.49) -(0.07) 
llgdp   -0.22 -0.17 -0.23 -0.21   -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.17 
    -(2.13) -(1.62) -(1.76) -(2.02)   -(1.15) -(1.18) -(1.13) -(1.15) 
stturnover   -0.13 -0.14 -0.04 -0.05   -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 
    -(1.50) -(1.56) -(0.37) -(0.59)   -(0.78) -(0.75) -(0.31) -(0.52) 
icrg10   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03   0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
    -(1.34) -(1.54) -(1.16) -(1.82)   -(0.14) -(0.13) -(0.06) -(0.56) 
age65   0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03   0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
    (1.13) (1.25) (1.27) (1.92)   (0.93) (0.94) (0.90) (1.59) 
tax   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    -(1.08) -(0.81) -(1.38) -(1.11)   -(0.95) -(0.96) -(1.10) -(0.82) 
hb   -0.10 0.01       -0.06 -0.07     
    -(2.11) (0.13)       -(1.23) -(0.76)     
hb*giniall_adj     0.00         0.00     
      -(1.48)         (0.12)     
fb       0.06 -2.22       0.04 -2.52 
        (0.18) -(1.95)       (0.17) -(2.30) 
fb*giniall_adj         0.06         0.07 
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          (1.97)         (2.37) 
nobs   122 122 123 123   122 122 123 123 
r-squared   0.580 0.587 0.548 0.578   0.338 0.338 0.321 0.379 
year fixed 
effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for 
Clustered 
Errors 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.6a: Alternative Income Inequality Measures -- WIID2 Gini 
WIID2 Gini is Income Gini from WIID2 database by WIDER.  developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World 
Bank's WDI database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are the lagged, present and expected dividend growth 
rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from 
BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 
'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's 
more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ 
holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total 
market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
Dependent Variable: MSCI P/D 
Inequality Measures:  6A: WIID2 Gini 
MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
WIID2 Gini -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
-(2.37) -(0.64) -(2.29) -(2.34) -(2.14) (0.26) -(1.99) -(4.78) 
WIID2 Gini*developed -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
-(2.88) -(5.78) -(4.57) -(2.35) -(3.04) -(2.38) -(4.55) 
gdppercap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(1.89) (3.78) (3.80) (2.06) (2.67) (2.84) (4.21) 
rrf -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
-(4.15) -(3.85) -(3.85) -(3.14) -(3.06) -(3.57) -(4.17) 
inflation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-(0.82) -(1.51) -(2.00) -(2.27) -(2.49) -(2.27) -(2.64) 
div_g -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.21 -0.23 -0.20 -0.26 
-(2.89) -(2.86) -(2.92) -(2.13) -(2.50) -(2.08) -(2.97) 
ldiv_g -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
-(2.27) (0.14) (0.14) -(0.22) -(0.31) -(0.37) -(0.33) 
ediv_g 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.41 
(4.18) (4.12) (4.16) (3.92) (3.98) (3.92) (3.92) 
vol 2.94 3.39 3.52 3.71 4.18 3.09 3.57 
(1.72) (2.36) (2.41) (2.26) (2.59) (1.98) (2.43) 
legal -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
-(1.09) -(1.01) -(1.20) -(1.15) -(1.22) -(1.45) 
llgdp 0.24 0.17 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
(1.97) (1.22) -(0.19) -(0.10) (0.14) (0.06) 
stturnover -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 
-(0.28) -(0.43) -(1.04) -(1.24) -(0.53) -(0.25) 
icrg10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
-(1.87) -(1.91) -(1.74) -(2.20) -(1.95) -(3.02) 
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age65 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
(0.02) -(0.33) (0.00) -(0.28) (0.69) 
tax -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
-(1.31) -(1.01) -(0.48) -(0.79) -(0.31) 
hb -0.05 0.11 
-(1.14) (1.13) 
hb * WIID2 Gini 0.00 
-(1.64) 
fb -0.29 -3.62 
-(1.26) -(5.58) 
fb*WIID2 Gini 0.11 
(4.79) 
nobs  564 432 307 307 171 171 175 175 r-squared  0.042 0.317 0.460 0.472 0.488 0.505 0.477 0.543 year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Corrected for Clustered Errors  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.6B: Alternative Income Inequality Measure -- WIID2 Income Ratio 
WIID2 IR is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the income of the top 10% income population to the total income of the rest population. developed is the dummy variable for developed 
countries. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI database. rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are 
the lagged, present and expected dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. 
llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' 
from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10  is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the 
population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ 
holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market 
value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
                               Dependent Variable: MSCI P/D 
Inequality Measures:   6B: WIID2 IR 
MODEL   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
WIID2 IR   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
    -(2.15) -(1.35) -(2.45) -(2.36) -(2.48) (0.71) -(2.40) -(4.58) 
WIID2 IR*developed     -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
      -(2.32) -(4.83) -(4.27) -(2.65) -(3.29) -(2.30) -(2.97) 
gdppercap     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      (0.75) (1.64) (1.58) (0.92) (1.49) (0.92) (1.42) 
rrf     -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
      -(4.44) -(4.42) -(4.67) -(3.17) -(3.12) -(3.51) -(3.55) 
inflation     -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
      -(0.58) -(1.42) -(1.95) -(2.79) -(2.63) -(3.10) -(2.87) 
div_g     -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.36 -0.38 -0.36 -0.39 
      -(3.61) -(3.72) -(3.64) -(3.39) -(3.86) -(3.42) -(4.03) 
ldiv_g     -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
      -(3.38) -(1.25) -(1.27) -(2.02) -(2.44) -(2.28) -(2.63) 
ediv_g     0.29 0.27 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.36 
      (3.74) (3.92) (3.90) (3.24) (3.10) (3.22) (3.06) 
vol     2.54 3.45 3.67 4.44 4.30 4.26 4.65 
      (1.39) (2.25) (2.22) (2.49) (2.47) (2.46) (2.88) 
legal       -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
        -(0.40) -(0.29) -(0.26) -(0.35) -(0.17) -(0.15) 
llgdp       -0.09 -0.13 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 -0.16 
        -(0.55) -(0.72) -(0.92) -(0.89) -(0.76) -(0.78) 
stturnover       -0.12 -0.13 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19 
        -(0.98) -(1.08) -(2.06) -(1.98) -(1.69) -(1.69) 
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Table 2.6 B (cont.) 
 
icrg10       -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
        -(0.86) -(0.76) -(1.32) -(2.16) -(1.23) -(1.80) 
age65         0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
          (0.39) (0.42) (0.60) (0.53) (0.85) 
tax         -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
          -(1.49) -(0.55) (0.25) -(0.65) -(0.09) 
hb           -0.04 0.13     
            -(0.83) (1.58)     
hb * WIID2 IR             0.00     
              -(2.15)     
fb               -0.12 -1.52 
                -(0.41) -(2.87) 
fb*WIID2 IR                 0.04 
                  (2.75) 
nobs   364 283 216 216 115 115 116 116 
r-squared   0.051 0.359 0.483 0.494 0.597 0.621 0.593 0.614 
year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered Errors   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.7: Robustness check – Total GDP and Population   
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic from World Bank.WIID2 Gini is Income Gini from 
WIID2 database by WIDER. WIID2 IR is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the income of the top 10% income population to the total income of the rest population.  developed is the dummy 
variable for developed countries. gdp is the GDP(constant 2000 US$) from World Bank's WDI database. population is the total population of each country, also from WDI. rrf is the Real Interest 
Rate. rrf and inflation are also both from WDI. ldiv_g, div_g and ediv_g are the lagged, present and expected dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. 
vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from 
BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is 
share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio 
of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
    Giniall_adj   WIID2 GINI   WIID2 IR 
Dependent Variables:   MSCI P/D   GFD P/D   MSCI P/D   MSCI P/D 
    Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
Inequality   -0.01 -0.03   -0.02 -0.02   -0.01 -0.04   0.01 -0.02 
    -(0.65) -(4.10)   -(1.10) -(3.55)   -(0.33) -(4.26)   (0.59) -(4.74) 
Inequality * developed   -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.02   -0.02 -0.02 
    -(1.48) -(1.69)   -(1.60) -(2.29)   -(2.48) -(4.10)   -(3.47) -(3.47) 
gdp   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
    (1.00) (3.29)   (0.16) (1.91)   (2.18) (6.23)   (3.33) (5.18) 
population   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
    (1.31) (2.08)   (1.02) (1.64)   -(0.27) -(0.55)   -(1.37) -(1.40) 
rrf   -0.04 -0.04   -0.03 -0.04   -0.04 -0.04   -0.04 -0.04 
    -(3.68) -(4.06)   -(2.37) -(2.89)   -(2.87) -(3.08)   -(3.26) -(3.37) 
inflation   -0.02 -0.03   0.00 0.00   -0.03 -0.02   -0.03 -0.03 
    -(2.00) -(2.62)   (0.08) -(0.16)   -(1.97) -(2.05)   -(2.62) -(2.64) 
div_g   -0.31 -0.31   -0.16 -0.17   -0.22 -0.27   -0.37 -0.38 
    -(3.94) -(3.90)   -(1.24) -(1.28)   -(2.54) -(3.22)   -(3.73) -(3.86) 
ldiv_g   -0.11 -0.12   -0.05 -0.07   -0.02 -0.01   -0.08 -0.07 
    -(1.66) -(1.97)   -(0.54) -(0.83)   -(0.32) -(0.34)   -(2.24) -(2.29) 
ediv_g   0.18 0.15   -0.01 -0.04   0.39 0.39   0.35 0.36 
    (2.51) (1.86)   -(0.07) -(0.37)   (3.98) (4.00)   (3.16) (3.14) 
mscivol   7.47 8.13   3.10 3.73   3.58 3.71   3.99 4.45 
    (3.58) (4.08)   (1.25) (1.50)   (1.89) (2.10)   (2.23) (2.70) 
legal   -0.06 -0.03   -0.04 -0.01   -0.02 0.00   0.05 0.06 
    -(0.64) -(0.36)   -(0.58) -(0.10)   -(0.27) (0.00)   (0.75) (0.91) 
llgdp   -0.08 -0.07   -0.14 -0.08   0.05 0.10   -0.21 -0.20 
    -(0.66) -(0.76)   -(0.91) -(0.54)   (0.28) (0.59)   -(0.95) -(1.02) 
stturnover   -0.17 -0.15   -0.09 -0.09   -0.16 -0.14   -0.23 -0.25 
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    -(1.75) -(1.60)   -(0.92) -(1.01)   -(1.59) -(1.49)   -(2.26) -(2.33) 
icrg10   -0.01 -0.01   0.00 0.00   -0.01 -0.01   -0.02 -0.02 
    -(0.84) -(0.55)   (0.35) (0.41)   -(0.54) -(0.51)   -(2.31) -(2.02) 
age65   0.03 0.04   0.02 0.04   0.01 0.03   0.01 0.02 
    (2.02) (3.02)   (1.25) (1.96)   (0.51) (1.69)   (0.60) (0.80) 
tax   0.00 0.00   -0.01 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.01 0.01 
    -(0.23) -(0.29)   -(0.79) -(0.43)   -(0.12) (0.40)   (0.78) (0.84) 
hb   0.01     -0.07     0.04     0.15   
    (0.17)     -(0.74)     (0.42)     (1.83)   
hb* Inequality   0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
    -(1.28)     (0.20)     -(0.72)     -(1.90)   
fb     -1.42     -2.02     -3.01     -1.38 
      -(1.28)     -(1.89)     -(4.78)     -(3.03) 
fb*Inequality     0.05     0.06     0.10     0.04 
      (1.61)     (2.06)     (5.01)     (3.11) 
nobs   122 123   122 123   171 175   115 116 
r-squared   0.586 0.597   0.337 0.378   0.490 0.548   0.641 0.644 
year fixed effects    Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered Errors   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
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Table 2.8: Expected Excess Returns vs. Income Gini from World Bank "All-the-Ginis" 
Dataset  
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. lngross is the log of the price dividend ratio computed from 
MSCI international equity indices. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI database.  rrf is the Real Interest Rate. rrf 
and inflation are also both from WDI.  ediv_g is the expected dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns 
indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et 
al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) 
& 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the 
fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax 
Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s 
world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held 
by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data.   ,   =   +   ∗            , +   ∗          , +     ∗   , +     ∗   +      +   ,  
  Dependent Variable: Realized MSCI Excess Returns 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
giniall_adj -0.15 -0.25 -0.23 -0.11 0.13 0.00 
  -(0.81) -(1.19) -(0.97) -(0.34) (0.20) (0.01) 
giniall_adj * developed   0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.25 -0.34 
    (0.71) -(0.52) -(0.71) -(0.77) -(1.07) 
lngross   -8.98 -8.65 -8.62 -12.09 -12.34 
    -(2.67) -(2.17) -(2.14) -(1.97) -(2.01) 
gdppercap     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      (1.03) (0.76) (0.33) (0.87) 
rrf   -0.11 -0.43 -0.41 -1.90 -2.03 
    -(0.40) -(1.15) -(1.06) -(2.73) -(2.76) 
inflation   0.73 0.70 0.59 -1.31 -1.40 
    (1.55) (0.98) (0.91) -(0.91) -(0.98) 
ediv_g   0.00 1.34 0.88 10.57 9.51 
    (0.00) (0.60) (0.37) (1.48) (1.39) 
vol   3.96 -11.92 -11.08 157.07 164.99 
    (0.04) -(0.10) -(0.09) (1.12) (1.19) 
legal     0.29 0.31 -2.89 -1.97 
      (0.14) (0.15) -(1.10) -(0.71) 
llgdp     -2.44 -2.83 -4.45 -3.91 
      -(0.54) -(0.50) -(0.45) -(0.40) 
stturnover     -7.50 -6.83 -8.32 -6.65 
      -(1.76) -(1.67) -(2.38) -(1.85) 
icrg10     -0.48 -0.47 -0.73 -0.86 
      -(0.78) -(0.76) -(0.90) -(1.04) 
age65       0.58 0.13 0.43 
        (0.74) (0.19) (0.55) 
tax       -0.18 0.00 0.05 
        -(0.74) -(0.01) (0.11) 
hb         -2.48   
          -(0.64)   
hb*giniall_adj         0.00   
          (0.01)   
fb           -70.63 
            -(1.81) 
fb*giniall_adj           1.92 
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             (1.88) 
nobs 444 390 252 252 118 118 
r-squared 0.001 0.047 0.061 0.065 0.170 0.175 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered 
Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.9: Real Interest Rate vs. Income Gini from World Bank "All-the-Ginis" Dataset  
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. netsaving is the net national savings as percentage of GNI from 
WDI database of World Bank. gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI database.  div_g is the dividend growth rate 
computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is 
(Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the 
product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from 
International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the 
personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s 
stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of 
total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb 
are calculated from CPIS data. 
  Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
giniall_adj 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.40 0.25 0.19 0.18 
  (2.52) (2.11) (2.38) (2.09) (2.10) (2.55) (1.70) (3.22) 
giniall_adj * 
developed   0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
    (0.28) (0.11) (0.23) (0.92) (1.00) (0.41) (0.22) 
netsaving             -0.41 -0.41 
              -(5.90) -(5.54) 
gdppercap   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    -(0.09) -(0.43) -(0.46) -(1.38) -(1.76) -(1.56) -(1.77) 
div_g   -1.36 -0.81 -0.65 -0.86 -0.79 -0.59 -0.61 
    -(2.71) -(0.59) -(0.51) -(0.67) -(0.65) -(0.67) -(0.71) 
vol   10.68 7.69 11.90 19.54 20.00 18.99 19.50 
    (0.53) (0.37) (0.50) (1.39) (1.37) (2.24) (2.26) 
legal     0.12 0.12 -1.32 -1.28 0.03 -0.01 
      (0.24) (0.26) -(1.95) -(1.75) (0.13) -(0.04) 
llgdp     -4.43 -4.17 -0.07 -0.50 -0.12 -0.11 
      -(2.03) -(1.66) -(0.05) -(0.34) -(0.15) -(0.13) 
stturnover     -2.92 -3.07 0.91 0.84 1.34 1.09 
      -(1.81) -(1.83) (1.36) (0.98) (1.99) (1.51) 
icrg10     0.10 0.09 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.42 
      (0.73) (0.64) (1.78) (1.65) (4.64) (4.04) 
age65       -0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.33 -0.34 
        -(0.44) (0.02) -(0.06) -(4.56) -(3.82) 
tax       0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 
        (1.24) (1.16) (1.00) -(1.56) -(1.23) 
hb         1.02   0.31   
          (1.32)   (0.58)   
hb*giniall_adj         -0.02   0.00   
          -(1.00)   -(0.04)   
fb           -3.03   0.66 
            -(0.41)   (0.14) 
fb*giniall_adj           0.05   -0.01 
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Table 2.9 (cont.) 
 
 
            (0.25)   -(0.08) 
nobs 488 381 248 248 122 123 119 120 
r-squared 0.073 0.109 0.286 0.293 0.470 0.467 0.711 0.710 
year fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for 
Clustered 
Errors 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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CHAPTER 3 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean (main variables) 
rrf is the T-bill rate obtained from IMF adjusted for inflation. Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with 
"net income"-based Gini (multiplied by 100), adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic from World Bank. Type of Market indicates 
whether the country is developed(DEV) or emerging market(EMG). grosssaving is the gross national savings as percentage of GNI 
from WDI database of World Bank.  riskshare is the log value of ratio of the volatility in Per Capita GDP growth to the volatility of 
Per Capita consumption growth (i.e. Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) ) from World Bank.   
Country /Region Type of Market rrf ginial_adj grosssaving riskshare 
Australia DEV 2.90 35.48 23.03 0.02 
Austria DEV 1.06 31.39 24.20 0.40 
Belgium DEV 3.47 27.44 24.93 0.59 
Brazil EMG 12.40 58.05 16.85 -0.13 
Canada DEV 2.27 32.24 21.38 0.44 
China EMG -1.39 36.19 41.90 -0.41 
Colombia EMG 11.15 54.98 17.99 -0.54 
Czech Republic EMG 0.54 23.35 25.63 0.31 
Denmark DEV 5.44 32.51 21.45 0.23 
Egypt EMG -0.36 37.38 22.93 -0.30 
Finland DEV 0.93 29.84 24.66 0.37 
France DEV 1.75 37.18 20.17 0.61 
Germany DEV 2.20 33.19 21.15 0.68 
Greece DEV 0.95 36.00 17.07 0.16 
Hong Kong  DEV 0.26 42.93 31.00 0.19 
Hungary EMG 2.36 26.83 20.73 -0.34 
India EMG 4.06 34.67 24.75 -0.19 
Indonesia EMG 5.97 36.43 27.18 -0.60 
Ireland DEV 1.03 35.84 22.94 0.08 
Israel DEV 0.99 37.81 18.25 0.46 
Italy DEV 2.88 36.08 22.08 0.46 
Japan DEV 0.27 32.99 29.85 0.53 
Korea, Rep. EMG 1.01 33.84 32.23 0.15 
Malaysia EMG 1.54 47.08 32.05 -0.42 
Mexico EMG 3.93 52.75 21.55 0.06 
Morocco EMG 1.78 37.40 23.95 -0.14 
Netherlands DEV 2.13 30.27 25.60 0.48 
New Zealand DEV 2.88 35.32 18.88 0.25 
Norway DEV 3.52 31.58 29.60 0.20 
Peru EMG 18.22 50.73 19.85 -0.10 
Philippines EMG 2.60 46.30 22.17 -0.16 
Poland EMG -2.18 29.80 18.00 0.44 
Portugal DEV -2.22 36.70 21.30 0.15 
Russian 
Federation EMG 0.21 35.80 29.14 -0.48 
Singapore DEV 0.29 40.62 41.17 0.20 
South Africa EMG 0.61 60.49 21.62 -0.33 
Spain DEV 2.96 31.83 22.22 0.18 
Sweden DEV 2.04 28.47 22.64 0.47 
Switzerland DEV 1.08 33.20 30.13 0.67 
Thailand EMG 2.22 44.11 29.07 -0.22 
United Kingdom DEV 1.46 33.56 16.73 0.17 
United States DEV 1.24 35.74 16.78 0.30 
No. of Obs   1196 723 1438 1843 
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Table 3.1B: Descriptive Statistics: Mean (controls) 
gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI database.   div_g is the dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the 
volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from 
BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk 
Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home 
bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is 
deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from 
CPIS data. 
Country /Region gdppercap div_g vol llgdp 
stturnove
r age65 Legal icrg10 tax hb fb 
Australia 17137 0.08 0.07 0.51 0.57 10.48 3.67 78 45 3.89 0.19 
Austria 17108 0.15 0.06 0.72 0.48 14.77 2.5 82 50 6 0.31 
Belgium 16534 0.06 0.06 0.58 0.28 14.74 1.67 80 50 4.81 0.25 
Brazil 2928 0.22 0.12 0.44 0.43 4.56 1.67 72.25 27.5 4.39 0.21 
Canada 17849 0.07 0.06 0.68 0.53 10.27 3.67 81.75 50 2.94 0.47 
China 525 0.72 0.1   1.15 5.5 0.75 76.75 45     
Colombia 1972 0.22 0.09 0.24 0.08 4.09 1 65.5 33 7.15 0.03 
Czech Republic 5795 0.5 0.08 0.66 0.5 12.64 3.33 72.75 15 6.88 0.21 
Denmark 22202 0.08 0.06 0.5 0.58 14.02 4 82 51.5 5.34 0.23 
Egypt 990 0.23 0.09 0.63 0.19 3.74 1.17 66.75 20 6.63 0.06 
Finland 16955 0.18 0.08 0.48 0.69 12.16 3.5 80.75 51 4.5 0.52 
France 16319 0.09 0.06 0.63 0.69 14.16 2.5 75.5 40 2.84 0.31 
Germany 18801 0.1 0.06 0.66 1.19 15.19 2.08 80.5 42 3 0.32 
Greece 9243 0.35 0.1 0.51 0.27 13.44 1.5 70.25 40 5.64 0.16 
Hong Kong  15797 0.1 0.1 2.13 0.49 7.47 4.17 81.25 16 3.74 0.16 
Hungary 3674 0.28 0.11 0.46 0.57 13.06 1.33 67.25 32 6.97 0.39 
India 321 0.09 0.09 0.38 0.81 3.76 3.33 70.5 30.9 4.54 0.15 
Indonesia 593 0.16 0.14 0.3 0.31 4.07 2 67 30 6.17 0.19 
Ireland 14362 0.05 0.06 0.64 0.46 11.09 4 73.25 41 4.15 0.93 
Israel 14069 0.23 0.07 0.67 0.57 8.31 3.33 68.75 44 5.71 0.25 
Italy 13880 0.07 0.07 0.65 0.9 14.47 1.67 74.25 43 3.67 0.29 
Japan 26035 0.07 0.06 1.5 0.7 11.62 2.92 81 40 2.21 0.16 
Korea, Rep. 6246 0.15 0.1 0.42 1.4 5.23 2.92 75.5 38.5 4.4 0.22 
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Table 3.1 B (cont.) 
 
 
Malaysia 2499 0.1 0.08 0.81 0.33 3.73 3.33 74.5 26 5.26 0.13 
Mexico 4678 0.24 0.09 0.26 0.36 4.37 1 69.25 30 4.9 0.32 
Morocco 1070 0.12 0.05 0.53 0.14 4.13   73.25 38     
Netherlands 17365 0.08 0.05 0.72 0.98 11.94 3 81 52 3.39 0.51 
New Zealand 11307 0.02 0.08 0.49 0.33 10.22 3.67 75.25 39 6.77 0.22 
Norway 25510 0.11 0.08 0.53 0.75 14.35 3.5 89.5 40 5.44 0.28 
Peru 2126 0.34 0.09 0.26 0.16 4.12 2.04 69 30     
Philippines 884 0.3 0.09 0.33 0.25 3.27 1.25 68.5 32 6.58 0.13 
Poland 4417 0.4 0.14 0.38 0.51 9.96 1.5 75 32 6.39 0.14 
Portugal 7164 0.1 0.07 0.94 0.37 12.44 2.08 71 45.88 5.7 0.37 
Russian Federation 2219 0.51 0.15 0.25 0.35 9.92 2.67 66.5 13 4.95 0.17 
Singapore 13020 0.11 0.08 0.78 0.56 5.29 4.17 82.5 20 4.94 0.26 
South Africa 3105 0.09 0.08 0.51 0.25 3.52 2.08 70 40 4.56 0.09 
Spain 10088 0.07 0.06 0.75 1.14 12.64 4.17 70.75 43 3.69 0.21 
Sweden 21326 0.13 0.07 0.51 0.81 15.96 3.5 82 57.77 4.33 0.28 
Switzerland 29258 0.11 0.05 1.14 0.88 13.6 2.5 84.75 32.3 3.32 0.37 
Thailand 1215 0.19 0.11 0.65 0.67 4.68 1.67 65 37 5.96 0.21 
United Kingdom 18404 0.07 0.06 0.62 0.65 14.64 4.58 73.75 40 2.2 0.34 
United States 25549 0.05 0.04 0.68 1.2 11.3 2.5 76.75 35 0.79 0.09 
No. of Obs 1953 1126 1202 1643 952 2057 2089 2141 2146 493 503 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Correlations 
rrf is the T-bill rate from IMF adjusted for inflation. Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko 
Milanovic from World Bank. Type of Market indicates whether the country is developed(DEV) or emerging market(EMG). gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database.   div_g is the dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is 
(Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov 
et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more 
than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s 
stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic 
equity held by foreign investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. grosssaving is the gross national savings as percentage 
of GNI from WDI database of World Bank.  riskshare is the log value of the ratio of the volatility in Per Capita GDP growth to the volatility of Per Capita consumption growth (i.e. 
Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) ) from Wrold Bank.   
Variable rrf giniall_adj gdppercap div_g vol llgdp 
stturnove
r age65 legal icrg10 tax hb fb grosssaving riskshare 
rrf 1                             
giniall_adj 0.31 1                           
gdppercap -0.09 -0.46 1                         
div_g -0.05 0.04 -0.1 1                       
vol 0.11 0.14 -0.38 0.04 1                     
llgdp -0.16 -0.25 0.58 -0.08 -0.26 1                   
stturnover -0.16 -0.28 0.31 -0.05 0.15 0.16 1                 
age65 -0.07 -0.6 0.76 -0.05 -0.34 0.37 0.26 1               
legal -0.05 -0.27 0.44 -0.1 -0.25 0.24 0.11 0.28 1             
icrg10 -0.09 -0.41 0.69 -0.08 -0.35 0.35 0.23 0.49 0.48 1           
tax -0.02 -0.31 0.37 -0.07 -0.33 -0.03 0.16 0.44 0.12 0.38 1         
hb 0.21 0.2 -0.62 0.13 0.4 -0.4 -0.37 -0.4 -0.36 -0.43 -0.23 1       
fb -0.25 -0.29 0.38 -0.08 -0.15 0.11 0.17 0.35 0.26 0.25 0.33 -0.26 1     
grosssaving -0.18 -0.18 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.15 -0.13 0.09 0.29 -0.18 -0.01 0.06 1   
riskshare -0.1 -0.25 0.48 -0.01 -0.17 0.28 0.18 0.46 0.18 0.39 0.28 -0.28 0.28 0 1 
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Table 3.3: Interest Rate vs. Inequality: Saving Rates 
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable 
for developed countries. grosssaving is the gross national savings as percentage of GNI from WDI database of World Bank.  gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database.   div_g is the dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid 
Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 
'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more than 65 years old 
from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb (home bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market 
capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign 
investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. Numbers in the brackets are t-statistics. 
                               Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate 
    A: Original   B: With Saving Rates 
MODEL   1  2  3  4  5  6  7    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
giniall_adj   0.22 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.40 0.25   0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.27 0.16 
    (2.52) (2.69) (2.11) (2.38) (2.09) (2.12) (2.56)   (2.38) (2.55) (2.38) (2.67) (1.31) (2.11) (2.43) 
giniall_adj * developed     0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04     0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
      (0.98) (0.28) (0.11) (0.23) (0.90) (1.00)     (0.48) (0.44) -(0.16) (0.31) -(0.13) -(0.13) 
grosssaving                   -0.25 -0.24 -0.28 -0.31 -0.36 -0.42 -0.41 
                    -(4.65) -(4.65) -(3.85) -(3.90) -(3.76) -(5.08) -(4.64) 
gdppercap       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        -(0.09) -(0.43) -(0.46) -(1.37) -(1.76)       -(0.10) -(1.64) -(0.88) -(1.24) -(1.90) 
div_g       -1.36 -0.81 -0.65 -0.86 -0.79       -1.03 -0.73 -0.56 -0.85 -0.86 
        -(2.71) -(0.59) -(0.51) -(0.67) -(0.65)       -(2.27) -(0.68) -(0.54) -(0.95) -(1.02) 
vol       10.68 7.69 11.90 19.54 20.00       16.60 15.08 15.14 22.46 23.85 
        (0.53) (0.37) (0.50) (1.40) (1.37)       (0.78) (0.62) (0.60) (2.04) (2.26) 
legal         0.12 0.12 -1.32 -1.28         0.62 0.58 -0.17 -0.25 
          (0.24) (0.26) -(1.95) -(1.75)         (1.35) (1.15) -(0.62) -(0.75) 
llgdp         -4.43 -4.17 -0.07 -0.51         -1.64 -1.98 1.07 0.94 
          -(2.03) -(1.66) -(0.04) -(0.34)         -(0.79) -(0.93) (1.17) (0.96) 
stturnover         -2.92 -3.07 0.91 0.84         -2.42 -2.45 1.29 0.97 
          -(1.81) -(1.83) (1.37) (0.98)         -(1.56) -(1.64) (2.08) (1.38) 
icrg10         0.10 0.09 0.31 0.31         0.23 0.24 0.45 0.45 
          (0.73) (0.64) (1.78) (1.65)         (1.89) (1.89) (3.79) (3.41) 
age65           -0.10 0.00 -0.01           -0.28 -0.14 -0.14 
            -(0.44) (0.02) -(0.06)           -(1.27) -(1.61) -(1.43) 
tax           0.06 0.07 0.07           -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
            (1.24) (1.17) (1.00)           -(0.31) -(0.68) -(0.44) 
hb             1.05               1.02   
              (1.35)               (1.66)   
hb*giniall_adj             -0.02               -0.01   
              -(1.03)               -(0.96)   
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Table 3.3 (cont.) 
 
 
fb               -2.97               -1.94 
                -(0.40)               -(0.33) 
fb*giniall_adj               0.05               0.08 
                (0.24)               (0.55) 
nobs   488 488 381 248 248 122 123   446 446 372 246 246 121 122 
r-squared   0.073 0.078 0.109 0.286 0.293 0.470 0.467   0.150 0.150 0.232 0.368 0.382 0.684 0.674 
year fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered 
Errors   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.4: Real Interest Rate vs. Income Gini:  Risk Sharing Measure 
log(Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) ) 
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. riskshare is the log value of the ratio of the volatility in Per 
Capita GDP growth to the volatility of Per Capita consumption growth (i.e. Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) )from Wrold Bank.  gdppercap is the real GDP 
per capita from World Bank's WDI database.  div_g is the dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. 
vol is the volatility of MSCI International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). 
stturnover is Stock Market Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of 
Law' from PRS(2009); icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the 
population that's more than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. 
hb(home bias) is share of domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market 
capitalization weight; fb (foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign 
investors relative to the country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
  Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
giniall_adj 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.36 0.25 
  (2.22) (2.45) (2.14) (2.36) (2.08) (1.91) (2.62) 
giniall_adj * developed   0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 
    (1.10) (0.40) (0.05) (0.20) (1.26) (1.21) 
riskshare -0.45 -0.89 0.85 0.67 0.43 -1.51 -1.86 
  -(0.34) -(0.60) (0.53) (0.41) (0.26) -(1.28) -(1.59) 
gdppercap     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      -(0.22) -(0.46) -(0.47) -(1.41) -(1.67) 
div_g     -1.38 -0.86 -0.69 -0.63 -0.51 
      -(2.82) -(0.61) -(0.53) -(0.46) -(0.40) 
vol     13.25 6.68 10.96 26.18 28.21 
      (0.60) (0.32) (0.45) (1.72) (1.77) 
legal       0.15 0.15 -1.43 -1.39 
        (0.29) (0.29) -(2.25) -(2.08) 
llgdp       -4.51 -4.25 0.02 -0.25 
        -(1.98) -(1.58) (0.01) -(0.19) 
stturnover       -2.81 -2.99 0.65 0.43 
        -(1.90) -(1.97) (0.97) (0.54) 
icrg10       0.08 0.07 0.39 0.40 
        (0.51) (0.47) (2.09) (1.99) 
age65         -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 
          -(0.44) -(0.11) -(0.14) 
tax         0.06 0.09 0.10 
          (1.16) (1.51) (1.67) 
hb           0.80   
            (0.96)   
hb*giniall_adj           -0.02   
            -(0.69)   
fb             -4.49 
              -(0.72) 
fb*giniall_adj             0.07 
              (0.41) 
nobs 443 443 369 246 246 122 123 
r-squared 0.074 0.082 0.117 0.288 0.294 0.482 0.484 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.5: Real Interest Rate vs. Income Gini:  Risk Sharing Measure 
log(Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) )& Saving Rate 
Giniall_adj is the Income Gini measure that notionally consistent with "net income"-based Gini, adjusted from Dataset of Branko Milanovic 
from World Bank. developed is the dummy variable for developed countries. riskshare is the log value of the ratio of the volatility in Per 
Capita GDP growth to the volatility of Per Capita consumption growth (i.e. Vol(ΔY)/Vol(ΔC) ) from Wrold Bank.  grosssaving is the gross 
national savings as percentage of GNI from WDI database of World Bank.  gdppercap is the real GDP per capita from World Bank's WDI 
database.   div_g is the dividend growth rate computed from MSCI Equity performance and returns indices. vol is the volatility of MSCI 
International Equity index returns. llgdp is (Liquid Liabilities/ GDP) from BKL dataset in Beck et al(2006). stturnover is Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio is also from BKL. Legal is the product of 'Anti-director rights' from Djankov et al(2008) & 'Rule of Law' from PRS(2009); 
icrg10 is the country composite risk rating from International Country Risk Guide(ICRG). age65 is the fraction of the population that's more 
than 65 years old from World Bank. tax is the personal income tax rate from PWC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries. hb(home bias) is share of 
domestic investors’ holdings in their country’s stock market capitalization divided by their country’s world-market capitalization weight; fb 
(foreign investability) is deﬁned as the ratio of total market value of a country’s domestic equity held by foreign investors relative to the 
country’s total market capitalization. Both hb and fb are calculated from CPIS data. 
  Dependent Variable: Real Interest Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
giniall_adj 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.16 
  (2.11) (2.38) (2.41) (2.64) (1.32) (1.88) (2.52) 
giniall_adj * developed   0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
    (0.91) (0.80) -(0.20) (0.27) (0.24) (0.07) 
riskshare -0.42 -0.69 0.38 0.16 0.13 -0.99 -1.07 
  -(0.41) -(0.57) (0.27) (0.10) (0.08) -(1.23) -(1.32) 
grosssaving -0.25 -0.25 -0.28 -0.31 -0.36 -0.41 -0.40 
  -(4.95) -(5.02) -(4.06) -(3.98) -(3.86) -(5.17) -(4.70) 
gdppercap     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      -(0.14) -(1.62) -(0.88) -(1.27) -(1.84) 
div_g     -1.05 -0.74 -0.57 -0.70 -0.70 
      -(2.39) -(0.69) -(0.56) -(0.72) -(0.76) 
vol     21.46 15.04 15.03 26.92 28.60 
      (0.94) (0.60) (0.58) (2.39) (2.73) 
legal       0.61 0.57 -0.27 -0.35 
        (1.23) (1.07) -(0.89) -(0.99) 
llgdp       -1.64 -1.98 1.11 1.06 
        -(0.73) -(0.85) (1.25) (1.13) 
stturnover       -2.39 -2.42 1.12 0.73 
        -(1.67) -(1.77) (1.80) (1.06) 
icrg10       0.23 0.24 0.50 0.49 
        (1.73) (1.76) (3.96) (3.72) 
age65         -0.28 -0.15 -0.14 
          -(1.30) -(1.72) -(1.50) 
tax         -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
          -(0.30) -(0.34) -(0.02) 
hb           0.86   
            (1.33)   
hb*giniall_adj           -0.01   
            -(0.63)   
fb             -2.73 
              -(0.51) 
fb*giniall_adj             0.09 
              (0.65) 
nobs 426 426 360 244 244 121 122 
r-squared 0.164 0.167 0.239 0.368 0.382 0.689 0.680 
year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corrected for Clustered 
Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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